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Monitor Mania: Physician Regulation
Runs Amok!
Evan J. Ellman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Doctors used to be the stars at the center of the health care universe, and all the players - the nurses, the hospital administrators,
the medical support personnel - revolved around them. "Doctors' orders" were paramount. In life, as in law, the doctor was
truly the "captain of the ship.''

In the new health care order which has emerged in the last decade, doctors find themselves at the center of a different sort of constellation. Their decisions and judgments are monitored, reviewed,
and questioned by a variety of the very players who used to defer
unquestioningly to those decisions. The physician has become the
target of review by a variety of agencies, committees, organizational entities, peers, and colleagues, each with its own angle of
attack.
The doctor's head is in a vise, and the squeeze is on. From one
side, the not-so-veiled threat of a medical malpractice suit lurks
beneath the surface of most doctor-patient relationships, constituting an implicit form of critical monitoring by patients and their
lawyers.' This constant fear of litigation urges the doctor to avail
* Associate, Schopf & Weiss, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., magna cum laude, Yale University; J.D., Cornell Law School.
1. The "captain of the ship" refers to a doctrine which holds physicians responsible
for the negligent acts of nurses and other hospital employees under the physician's direct
supervision, particularly during surgery. See Graham v. St. Luke's Hosp., 46 Il.App. 2d
147, 159, 196 N.E.2d 355, 361 (1st Dist. 1964); see also Foster v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n,
19 Ill.
App. 3d 1055, 1059, 313 N.E.2d 255, 259 (1st Dist. 1974) ("The basis for all the
decisions upholding liability appears to be that the hospital employee becomes 'the borrowed servant' of the surgeon."); Annotation, Liability of Operating Surgeon for Negligence of Nurse Assisting Him, 12 A.L.R.3D 1017, 1021 (1967).
In Illinois, case law has eroded this doctrine. "The surgeon's own acts, which most
directly affect the life and well being of a patient, charge him with his own awesome
responsibility. He should not also be saddled with the role of guarantor of the patient's
safety from the negligence of others." Foster, 119 111. App. 3d at 1059, 313 N.E.2d at 259.
2. This fear of a malpractice suit has so permeated the doctor-patient relationship
that it gave rise to the following cartoon in a recent NEW YORKER: A doctor is depicted
talking to his partially disrobed patient in the office examining room. In the caption, he
states: "We medical practitioners do our very best, Mr. Nyman. Nothing is more sacred
to us than the doctor-plaintiff relationship."
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himself of the latest in technology and the highest caliber medicine,
regardless of cost. On the other hand, cost constraints, which are
of paramount concern to the hospital, the government, and private
payors, mandate that
cost considerations be a priority in making
3
decisions.
medical
This Article will provide an overview of the different forces and
entities which monitor and question the treatment decisions and
practice patterns of physicians. It will discuss the myriad of reviewing entities which exist at the behest of the state government,
the federal government, the private associational entities, the private institutional health care provider, and third-party reimbursers. This Article will also review the panoply of doctormonitoring activities which are ostensibly designed to improve the
quality and efficiency of health care in America, questioning what
impact these entities have on the independence of medical judgments and, ultimately, on quality of care.4
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The entrance of the United States government into the health
care arena with the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid legislation in 19655 heralded the beginning of the government's prolonged and wanton spending spree on medical costs. 6 As part of

President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society," Medicare and Medi3. For a discussion of this issue, see Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in
Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1985).
4. The sheer quantity of regulatory entities and the missions with which they are
charged bespeaks an area too varied to allow the author to make one consistent value
judgment, or one recommendation for a solution. The reader will, no doubt, draw his/her
own conclusions as the "big picture" emerges.
5. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395ccc (Supp.
1989) (referred to as "Medicare"). Medicare, title 18 of the Social Security Act, provides
health care payment by the government for citizens over 65 who are eligible for Social
Security, and for certain disabled persons. Medicare is entitled Health Insurance for the
Aged and Disabled Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395ccc (Supp. 1989). Medicaid, title 19 of
the Social Security Act, created a program and provided grants to the states to provide
for medical care to the indigent. Although Medicare and Medicaid are different programs, this Article will refer to both as "Medicare."
6. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE 96 (105th ed. 1985) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES]. In 1965, 6.1% of the gross national product was spent on health
care. That percentage rose to 10.5% in 1982, and was 11.5% in 1988, or $2,130 per
person, per year. Id. See also Califano, The Health Care Chaos, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 44. In dollars, that means that last year Americans spent more
than $550 billion on health care, and over $300 billion in 1982. Medicare has, for many
years, been the fastest growing part of our federal budget. Malcom, In Health Care Policy, The Latest Word is Fiscal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, § 4 (Magazine), at 3.
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caid were introduced to ensure that the aged and the needy would
have access to the same high quality medical care as the rest of
society.7 Legislators and politicians fashioned laws which assured
hospitals, nursing homes, doctors, pharmacists, and a host of medical paraprofessionals reimbursement for their "reasonable costs,"
whatever those costs might be, in the treatment of the poor and the
aged.8 Treatment for the poor previously had been performed free
of charge, with time being donated by physicians working in clinics, and hospital costs subsidized by paying patients. With the advent of Medicaid, no patient was indigent. Everyone could pay. 9
Congress appeared to have no idea what it was committing the
taxpayers to paying for when it assumed financial responsibility for
this medical care. Nor did Congress anticipate the many factors
which would escalate its financial commitment, including skyrocketing costs, I° exponentially increasing populations of poor, who
were covered by Medicaid, as well as new knowledge and technology which enabled the prolongation of life, and thereby prolongation and escalation of Medicare coverage." Moreover, Congress
did not fully anticipate the way the programs would be flagrantly
abused by health care providers eager to gorge at the public
trough. "2
7. See Malloy & Skinner, Medicare on the Critical List, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1984, at 122.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(f)(b)(1) (1982).
9. See Medicaid statutes, Title 19 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to
1396p (1982).
10. During 1986 and 1987 alone, the price of American health care increased at more
than twice the rate of inflation, and three times the overall rate in 1983. The rise in
physician's fees for services was so steep in 1987 that Medicare had to increase premiums
that people pay for physician care by 40%. See supra note 6.
11. The number of Medicare beneficiaries has increased by two million people in the
last three years alone. Statistics provided by the Health Care Financing Administration,
Washington, D.C.
12. In 1977 alone, it was estimated that abuse of the Medicare/Medicaid statutes,
mostly via fraudulently filed claims and unnecessary procedures and treatments, reached
between 725 and 975 million dollars. See Fraud, Abuse, Water & Mismanagement of
Programsby the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (July 20, 1978) (testimony of Thomas D. Morris, Inspector General, Dept. of
Health, Education and Welfare).
By 1987, excess billing by physicians alone, defined as physician charges over and
above those considered reasonable by the government, cost the Medicare program $2.7
billion dollars. A group called "Citizen Action," which monitors records maintained by
the Health Care Financing Administration, found that in 1987, an average of $38.11
excess billing was billed to Medicare on each of the 70.3 million doctor bills processed by
the Medicare program. See Doctors' Medicare Fees Criticized, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 4,
1988, at 10, col. I.
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At first, the medical profession resisted the entrance of the government into health care. 3 Physicians feared government involvement in medicine and decried "creeping'socialized medicine." But
little by little, physicians became accustomed to the increased income that resulted when they began to receive government checks
for treating patients who previously would have been treated free
of charge. 4 Ironically, it is now the American Medical Association ("AMA") which is spearheading the campaign to urge further
expansion of the same Medicaid program it originally opposed.15
As it turned out, Medicare/Medicaid proved to be a bonanza for
doctors and hospitals. Medical schools became glutted with students and applications as more and more people looked to the
medical profession as a sure passage to financial success. In search
of wealth in the "land of opportunity," doctors from all over the
world, particularly third world countries, rushed here to avail
themselves of our government's largesse. 6
As much as the doctors enjoyed this additional income, the government found its financial commitment expanding beyond its
most liberal projections. 7 It became starkly apparent that the
Medicare/Medicaid programs provided a strong financial incentive
for hospitals and doctors to maximize their usage of medical treatments, procedures, tests, and surgeries because they could be fully
13.

See generally Campion, AMA and US. Health Policy Since 1940, CHICAGO REV.
(1984). The AMA policy evolved from adamant opposition to acceptance of the
idea of national health insurance.
14. Among physicians, surgeons particularly benefitted from the government's generosity because surgeries are among the most costly form of medical treatment. A surgeon
operating in a teaching hospital would be paid not only for the surgeries he performed,
but those performed by medical residents as well. For such physicians, Medicaid enabled
them to earn thousands of additional dollars weekly for surgeries which had previously
gone uncompensated.
15. See Expansion of Medicaid is Proposed,Chicago Tribune, Feb. 17, 1989, at 1, col.
2. "A coalition led by the A.M.A.... proposed an overhaul of the Medicaid program to
expand coverage to 11 million more poor Americans, improve benefits and raise reimbursement rates for physicians and hospitals." Id.
16. So noticeable was the influx of foreign doctors after the passage of Medicare legislation that the AMA began to keep statistics on the numbers of foreign medical school
graduates practicing in the United States, including their countries of origin. Beginning
in 1970, the AMA began publication of a pamphlet entitled "Physician Characteristics
and Distribution in the United States." As of 1970, there were 57,217 foreign doctors
practicing in the United States, out of a total of 334,028 doctors. By 1986, out of a total
of 552,716 doctors, the number of foreign doctors practicing in the United States was
123,090, an increase of over 100% in 15 years.
17. By 1975, just five years after the program's inception, expenditures reached $4.95
billion, slightly more than twice the amount that had been projected for that year in 1965.
By 1980, Medicare expenditures approached $37 billion. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
PRESS

THE UNITED STATES,

supra note 6.
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reimbursed by the government.' 8 The more procedures that were
ordered and performed, the more money that flowed to doctors
and hospitals alike.' 9
As the Medicare "boondoggle" played on, doctors and hospitals
emerged as new "deep pockets" in personal injury litigation. 20
Never before has one profession so relentlessly attacked another
profession as lawyers have attacked doctors via medical malpractice litigation. 2 ' Any attempt to reform the tort laws to make it
more difficult to sue doctors has been met by plaintiff-oriented lawyers' claims that the doctors have not done enough to police themselves, 2 and that there is a rise in medical negligence claims
because there is more malpractice being committed. 23 Regardless
of whether the malpractice crisis represented more litigiousness toward doctors or truly an insurgence of faulty medical practice and
derelict self-discipline, physicians reacted by "covering them18. Providers were reimbursed on a retrospective fee-for-service basis of reimbursement, where all providers were paid a "reasonable charge," defined as "the customary
charge for similar services generally made by the physician or other person or organization furnishing the covered services, and also the prevailing charges for the locality for
similar services." S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 1943, 1949.
When the Reagan Administration proposed an increase in Medicare premiums of
38.5% for 1988 (the largest in Medicare's history), Congressman Fortney ("Pete") Stark
of California charged that "the current fee-for-services payment system gives doctors a
key to the treasury." See 15 Health Law. News Rep., Oct. 1987, at 1. See Comment,
Reagan Administration Health Legislation: The Emergence of a Hidden Agenda, 20
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 575, 586 (1983). The "reasonable cost" provision constituted an
"open-ended, cost-based, and cost-generating" reimbursement program. Id.
19. For example, the rapid growth in the number of coronary bypass surgeries performed each year, which were reimbursed at a rate of $25,000 per surgery, can in part be
attributed to Medicare's willingness to pay for it. Studies performed by the National
Institutes of Health and the Veterans Administration concluded that a whopping 60-80%
of the 250,000 coronary bypass surgeries performed each year are unnecessary in that
they gain no increase in lifespan for the patient beyond what could be achieved with
medical management. Califano, supra note 6, at 44.
20. See Green, Medical Malpractice and the Propensity to Litigate, in THE EcONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 193, 194 (S.Rottenberg ed. 1978).
21. See Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, RAND
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (1982); Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical MalpracticeLegal
System, Report of The Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice (1973); Barnett,
Medical Malpractice: The American Disease, 48 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 63 (1980); Brooke,
Medical Malpractice:A Socio-Economic Problem, 6 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225 (1970).
22. For a discussion of this viewpoint, see Report of The Illinois Medical Malpractice
Task Force to Governor James R. Thompson (1985) (available in Loyola University of
Chicago School of Law Library) (a report of the Illinois Medical Malpractice Task Force
which accuses doctors and hospitals of failing to adequately police their profession,
thereby giving rise to more actual malpractice).
23. N. MILLER, R. CORREIA & J. CHILL, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CRISIS OF LiTiGATION OR CRISIS OF NEGLIGENCE 15-19 (1987); see also Gest, When Lawyers SecondGuess Doctors, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 13, 1984, at 45.
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selves," ordering all possible diagnostical tests and treatments so
as to be in the best possible defensive position in case of a malpractice suit.24 A happy alliance was formed between physicians and

hospitals, both eager to maximize income and minimize risk of liability by practicing the most expensive, most procedure-oriented
medicine in history.25
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, more medicine seemed to
be equated with better medicine. More treatment was certainly better financially for the health care providers, who were generally
able to bill third parties for most of the costs of medical services to
patients.26 Medicine became big business. The world of doctors
and hospitals enlarged and gradually began to be referred to as the
"health care industry.

' 27

Many advances in surgical techniques

and medical technology were spurred on by this frenzy of medical
2s
activity. And the United States government was bankrolling it.

Something had to give. The spending spree could not continue.
Limiting who could qualify for coverage under Medicaid and
Medicare has not been politically feasible. 29 The government has
24. See Harris, Defensive Medicine.: It Costs, But Does It Work?, 257 J.A.M.A. 2801,
2801-02 (1987). "Failure to diagnose has been a classic basis for negligence actions
against physicians. To avert missed diagnoses, physicians apparently make widespread
use of blood chemistries, bone films, and other routine tests." Id.
The Harris article provides a quantitative analysis of the costs of defensive medicine.
"From 1983 to 1984, Reynolds et al. estimate that the average malpractice insurance
premium rose by $1,300 annually." Id. Concurrently, in response to a perceived increase
in malpractice risks, the AMA surveyed physicians reported changes in their medical
practices that were worth an additional $4600 per physician, per year. "The $4600 increase in defensive medicine costs was more than 3.5 times the concomitant $1800 increase in premiums." Id. Thus, for each $1.00 of additional malpractice insurance risk
(measured by premiums), an additional $3.50 in defensive medicine expenditures occurs.
"Defensive medicine" means more time with patients, more use of routine tests and blood
chemistries, more follow-up visits, and more time spent on record-keeping. Yet the frequency and severity of malpractice claims continues to rise. Harris concludes that "defensive medicine" is not effective risk-management. Id.
25. Americans spent almost $1,800 per person on health care in 1985. Califano,
supra note 6, at 46. The Canadians, who ranked second, spent $1,300. Id. The Japanese
spent $800 and the British spent $600. Id. Health care is sophisticated and modern in
these countries; life expectancy is at least as high as in the United States, and infant
mortality is lower. Id.
26. As of 1982, the last year when "reasonable cost" was the government's reimbursement formula, 94% of all hospital bills were paid for by third-party payors or the
government. See RICARDO-CAMPBELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF HEALTH
187 (1982).
27. This process developed gradually. This author never heard the term "health care
industry" until the mid- to late-1970s.
28. See Califano, supra note 6, at 44.
29. To the contrary, Congress reacted to the energetic lobbying of the American Association of Retired People ("AARP"), drug companies, and other health-care providers
by expanding categories of people entitled to Medicaid benefits (now, poor people who
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tried to aim its retrenching efforts at those who receive the government money: health care providers (primarily doctors and hospitals). 30 As Congress gaveth, so it now must try to taketh away.31
III.

MONITORING OF PHYSICIANS BY THE STATE

Before discussing the steps the federal government has recently
taken to try to retrench from its financial commitment to health
care, it is helpful to clarify how those steps dovetail with the existing state physician regulatory schemes. Prior to the federal government's entrance into the health care arena (i.e., before 1965),
the states were the sole governmental bodies charged with the responsibility of licensing and disciplining physicians. The state licensing boards were and still are the first "reviewers" of
physicians; they administer the examinations which determine
whether the physician will be issued a license. 32 Licenses to practice generally must be renewed periodically, 33 and it has customarily been the responsibility of the state licensing boards to
discipline errant physicians who have violated any of the list of
tenets of the profession.34
own property and would have previously lost eligibility for Medicaid, can attain Medicaid eligibility), and by expanding payments to hospitals. Medicare was expanded in
1988 by the passage of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 100 P.L. 360, 1988 H.R.
2470. This expansion, which had long been opposed by President Reagan, was finally
approved by him, constituting the first substantial Medicare expansion since its inception.
See Reagan OKs Expansion of Medicare Aid; Adds Warning About Necessity to Keep
Costs Under Control, L.A. Times, July 1, 1988, at 2, col. 1. Political analysts felt that the
Republicans were trying to counter Reagan's image as lacking compassion, as well as
trying to garner some lost support among the elderly. Politics May Bring Vetoes; It Also
Aids "Catastrophic Bill", Indus. Week, July 4, 1988, at 6.
In spite of the federal deficit and the health care cost crunch, the AMA has had the
"chutzpah" to try to further expand coverage under Medicaid so as to make an additional 11 million people eligible for benefits, and also to raise the reimbursement rates for
Medicaid patients by 50%. See Expansion of Medicaid is Proposed, Chicago Tribune,
Feb. 17, 1989, at 18, col. 5.
30. See infra notes 44-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of PROs and
DRGs, and notes 167-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Medicare fraud
and abuse statutes.
31. See infra Section IV for discussion of federal legislation designed to reduce federal
expenditures for health care.
32. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-12 (1989).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-21 (1989).
34. In Illinois, for example, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-22 (1989) lists 38
separate grounds on which the Illinois State Department of Registration and Education
can base disciplinary actions against physicians. These grounds range from "gross negligence in practice," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-22(4) (1989), to "fee-splitting or
referral fees," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, para. 4400-22(14) (1989), to "gross and wilful
and continued overcharging for professional services," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para.
4400-22(25) (1989). Many of these grounds duplicate or are only slightly different from
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The Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") of the Department
of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") conducted a study of
state medical licensing boards. 35 This "review of the reviewers"
concluded that in the two decades since the advent of the Medicare
program, the state medical boards have become so overwhelmed
with the increases in their workload that they have been unable to
effectively "weed out" incompetent doctors. 36 The OIG found
physician incompetence to be a problem of major proportions, and
yet also found that physician incompetence represented only a
small number of disciplinary cases.37
One of the main reasons cited for this discrepancy was the tremendous increase in work loads and responsibilities of the state
boards (indicative of the "monitor mania" which also has afflicted
the state boards), without a concomitant increase in staffing or
funding.3 s To adequately monitor physician incompetence, the
state boards need the cooperation of both physicians and hospitals.
This has been a major obstacle. Physicians and hospitals are reluctant to report incompetent doctors. Of course, there are great differences of opinion among physicians as to what exactly constitutes
incompetence,39 which has resulted in a near paralysis of the ability
of state boards to find a physician sufficiently "incompetent" to
deny him licensure.
The OIG report found that in the instances when disciplinary
proceedings have been held, they tend to be particularly complex,
long, and costly. Generally, the state boards' burden of proof for
disciplining physicians for medical incompetence is "clear and convincing evidence" - which is harder to prove than the civil law
standard of "more probable than not" that is applicable in malpractice cases. Such a burden of proof is so time consuming and
those on which other entities are basing their review of physicians. Gross negligence is
also monitored by the courts and litigants in malpractice actions, as well as by the government via the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101
(Supp. 1986), and by the hospital reviewing committees. The state government's review
of fee-splitting and referral fees is also reviewed by the federal government via the Medicare/Medicaid fraud and abuse statutes. The federal government also reviews Medicaid
claims, which duplicates the state government's duty to review the practice of overcharging, or filing false reports to support claims against Medicaid, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11,
para. 4400-22(21) (1989).
35. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW (1986).

36. For a discussion and summary of the OIG report, see Kusserow, Handley & Yessian, An Overview of State Medical Discipline, 257 J.A.M.A. 820 (1987).
37. Id. at 822-23.
38. Id. at 822.
39. Id. at 823.
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costly to meet that state boards ultimately do not commit their
4
limited time and resources to attempt to meet this standard. 0
The list of other reasons suggested for the failure of the states to
adequately "police" the competence of their physicians reflects the
overwhelming number of aspects of monitoring physicians with
which the state licensing bodies are charged. Consumer awareness
on the part of patients has caused a tremendous increase in consumer complaints against physicians which must be investigated.
The increase in litigiousness of patients has given rise to more malpractice suits, and the resulting malpractice insurance "crises"
have put renewed pressure on state medical boards to "weed out"
bad doctors. In some states, scandals involving fraudulent medical
credentials consume time and resources. The state licensing
boards also are responsible for monitoring and licensing foreign
medical students, many of whom have been trained in new medical
schools which are markedly inferior to United States and Canadian
schools. Even when such foreign graduates manage to pass the
equivalency tests in the United States, the state licensing boards
still are concerned about the inadequate clinical training the graduates of those medical schools have received, as well as the minimal
admission requirements needed to attend those schools.4 '
It is no wonder that the federal government, charged with sanctioning physicians for Medicare and Medicaid abuses,4 2 would
have liked to look to the states for assistance in doing their "spadework." However, the conclusions of the OIG report, highlighting
the inadequacy of the state licensing boards, led in part to the federal government's sense of urgency that it would have to enter the
physician regulatory arena, an area that traditionally had been left
to the states. The results of the OIG study played a large part in
the development of the reporting requirements and data bank provisions of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act.4 3
40. Id. In 1985, Wisconsin amended its medical practice act, allowing a court finding
of physician negligence in patient care to be conclusive evidence that the physician was
negligent, for purposes of the state board licensing hearing. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 448.02
(West 1988). Wisconsin also lessened its state board's burden of proof in disciplinary
proceedings, calling for a "preponderance of evidence," rather than "clear and convincing evidence" of incompetence. Id.
41. For a discussion of this problem, see Kusserow, Handley & Yessian, supra note
36, at 821. The disciplinary actions which the state boards do successfully pursue are
concerned mostly with excessive and unnecessary prescribing of drugs to patients, as well
as unlawful distribution to drug addicts. Furthermore, the state disciplinary boards have
been active in monitoring and disciplining physicians' self-abuse with drugs and/or alcohol. Felony and fraud are other case categories which the state investigators develop.
42. See infra Section IV(G) on Medicare fraud and abuse statutes.
43. See infra Section IV(E). See also Basanta, Quality Health Care and Physician
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MONITORING OF PHYSICIANS BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT

Government Mandated Peer Review

-

Creation of PROs

In 1982, Congress enacted the first of a series of laws designed to
cut back- on its excessive financial commitments to health care
providers. With the stated aim of promoting "efficient and high
quality care," the Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982" established a peer review organization ("PRO") program."a
The expressed purpose of this legislation is to enable the government to monitor the quality of health care, while recognizing that
it could best be done by physicians, particularly through local community physician peer review. 6 Of equal, if not greater importance to the government are cost containment objectives which the
PROs are also charged with monitoring.47 The PRO seeks to
ensure:
a) that medical services or items will be ordered or provided
economically, and only when "reasonably and medically necessary," as determined by their review; a"
b) that the services will be of a quality which
meets profes49
sionally recognized standards of health care;
c)

that health care providers should support decisions with

evidence of medical necessity and quality in a way that can be
reviewed by a PRO.5" In other words, the hospitals are required
to keep good records. 5
Regulation - Recent Developments, 77 ILL. B.J. 214, 215 (1988) for a thorough discussion of these reporting requirements.
44. Subtitle C of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"),
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.), which amended Part B of Title XI of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 97248, 96 Stat. 392 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
45. A PRO is an entity which is either "composed of a substantial number of the
licensed doctors of medicine and osteopathy engaged in the practice of medicine or surgery in the area" or "has available to it ... the services of a sufficient number of licensed
doctors of medicine ... or surgery in such area to assure that adequate peer review of the
services provided by the various medical specialties and subspecialties can be assured."
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-l(1)(A),(B) (1982).
46. A PRO for a particular area has the responsibility of reviewing the professional
activities of physicians and other health care practitioners relating to their provision of
services to Medicare beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1) (1982).
47. See generally Comment, Reagan Administration Health Legislation: The Emergence of a Hidden Agenda, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 575 (1983) [hereinafter Reagan Administration Health Legislation].
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)(A) (1982).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)(B) (1982).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (1982).
51. See 42 C.F.R. § 466.78(b)(2) (1985) (setting out the procedures for providing the
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The PRO is also charged with the responsibility of deciding
whether Medicare shall make payment for medical services. 2 It
was through this means that the government sought to gain some
control over monitoring expenditures.
Under this legislation, if the PRO determines that a health care
practitioner has violated his or her statutory obligations, the PRO
must decide whether the violation was a "gross and flagrant" violation.53 If so, the PRO must give the practitioner written notice
setting out this determination, the basis for it, and the sanction that
will be recommended. 4 The physician may then request a meeting
with the PRO within thirty days, and is entitled to be provided by
the PRO with a copy of the
written material upon which the
5
PRO's decision was based.

B.

Creation of DRGs

Soon after the PROs were formed, Congress instituted changes
in the reimbursement formula for hospitals that provide services
covered by Medicare. Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"), 56 Congress charged itself with the
responsibility of formulating a prospective payment system
("PPS"). Congress created such a system in 1983,1 7 which abolished the open-ended "reasonable cost" basis of reimbursing hospitals, and substituted a .fixed, predetermined amount of
reimbursement for a particular service or procedure. 8 These
amendments to the Social Security Act provided fixed payments
for Medicare inpatient hospital admissions59 which were classified
upon discharge according to government-prescribed "Diagnostic
Related Groups" ("DRGs"). The 468 DRGs defined fixed fee rePRO with patient care data so it can do a post-admission, pre-procedure review). The
question of who pays for those copying costs, which are substantial, arose in Burlington
Memorial Hospital v. Bowen, 644 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(2) (1982).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.40(a) (1986).
54. 42 C.F.R. §§ 1004.40(b), 1004.50 (1986).
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
56. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
57. See Title VI of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97
Stat. 65, 149 (Supp. 1986) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.);
Title I of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
58. See Title VI of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97
Stat. 65, 149 (amending § 601(a)(l) of the Social Security Act), which established Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient Hospital Services.
59. See I Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
4204, at 1511-13 (July 1984).
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imbursement rates to the hospital based on the diagnosis, 6° regardless of the actual costs incurred in treating the patient.6 ' Congress'
hope was that reimbursement of a fixed fee for each type of diagnosis would create incentives for hospitals to operate in a more costefficient manner.62
Hospitals had based all their long-term planning on expectations
of a continued "reasonable cost" based reimbursement rate.63
Thus, DRGs presented a drastic change in the payment formula
for hospitals, which, in turn, had a drastic effect on the administration of the hospitals. 6' The DRGs effect on the physicians' relationship with the hospital was nothing short of revolutionary.65
The use of DRGs prompted a 180-degree turn around in how physicians related to hospitals. Before September 1, 1983, hospitals
stood to gain by having physicians on their staff who did a lot of
procedures in the hospital and who were liberal in their utilization
of hospital facilities. After September 1, 1983, hospitals stood to
lose more money as the physician performed more procedures.
Hospitals can only make a profit to the extent that they keep their
costs below the fixed DRG rate.66 Suddenly and precipitously, less
medical intervention meant more money to the hospital.67 While
the government professed that nothing it was mandating should be
construed as authorizing federal interference with the provision of
medical treatment, 6s overnight, the conservative method of treatment became the method most favored by the institutional health
care facility. Procedure-oriented physicians felt the pressure to do
an "about-face" in their practice patterns.69
60. DRGs are based on the patient's primary and secondary diagnoses, the patient's
age, the primary and secondary procedures used, the complications experienced, and concurrent diseases. When the condition is more complex, the rate of reimbursement is
higher. See Reagan Administration Health Legislation, supra note 47, at 590.
61. See I Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 4204, at 1511-13 (July 1984).
62. S. REP. No. 98-23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 143, 187.
63. Id.; see also HospitalsReduce Costs, Length of Stay, HOSPITALS, Sept. 16, 1984, at
37.
64. See Davis, The Impact of DRG's on Cost & Qualityof Health Care in the U.S.A., 9
HEALTH POL'Y 117, 117-31 (1988).
65. See Zaslow, Life After Legislation: Effects of TEFRA and DRG on PhysicianHospital Relationships, LEGAL Asp. OF MED. PRAC., Jan. 1984, at 1-2.
66. For a full discussion of the background behind this change, see American Hospital Association v. Bowen, 640 F. Supp. 453 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
67. Ellstein, A Look Back at P.P.S.; D.R.G.'s After Four Years, 24 MICH. HosP. 21,
21-23 (1988).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982) (introductory paragraph to the Social Security Act).
69. See Davis, supra note 64, at 117-31.
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In a way, the new post-DRG health care order pushed in diametric opposition to the anti-malpractice hospital policies and procedures which had tended to encourage doctors to practice
"defensive medicine," such as performing extensive diagnostic
workups so as to be in the best position in a "failure to diagnose"
medical malpractice situation."° Because hospitals stood to lose
money from doctors who freely utilize diagnostic and other procedures, new policies and procedures had to be put into effect which
limited the appropriate diagnostic work-up and treatment for different diseases and injuries, depending on their DRG financial
allotment.
Performing expensive and numerous tests to rule out differential
diagnoses are no longer within the doctor's sole discretion. 7 The
hospital examines the need for those tests; it will, in effect, second
guess the doctor's order based on cost considerations.7 2 If a hospital only stands to make a profit through under-utilization of procedures and treatment modalities, then it will encourage underutilization.73
How does this affect quality of care?" Some would applaud
Congress' cost-cutting goals, and point to the excessive overutilization of unnecessary tests and procedures which add their own level
of risk.75 But it cannot be denied that the far more likely outcome
will be that health care will be provided at a level below that which
is technologically feasible. 7 6 A few more needed days of hospitalization will be foregone, which will prolong patient recuperation
70. See Harris, supra note 24, for a discussion of the analytical techniques applied to
data reflecting the increased medical costs generated by physicians practicing defensive
medicine.
71. Hospitals make these evaluations through their Utilization Review and Quality
Assurance programs. See infra Section VI for a discussion of utilization review and quality assurance.
72.

Note, Rethinking Medical MalpracticeLaw in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98

HARv. L. REV. 1004, 1022 (1985) [hereinafter Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law].
That Note suggests that legislators have created a rebuttable presumption of joint hospital-physician liability in cases when the malpractice claim arises from a failure to order
tests or procedures, or is otherwise due to cost-cutting concerns.
73. See Zaslow, supra note 65.
74. See Note, Medicare'sProspective Payment System; Can Quality Care Survive?, 69
IOWA L. REV. 1417 (1984).
75. See, e.g., ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH 15, 26-

32 (1976) (decrying "overcare" and resulting iatrogenic illness as a danger to public
health). See also Wong & Lincoln, Ready, Fire! ...
Test Ordering, 250 J.A.M.A. 2510 (1983).

76.

Aim!: An Inquiry into Laboratory

See Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law, supra note 72, at 1007. See also

Schwartz, The Competitive Strategy.- Will it Affect the Quality of Care?,in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE 15, 20 (J. Meyer ed. 1983).
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times. In addition, low-risk services (such as diagnostic tests),
whose elimination might impair the quality of care, will be
sacrificed.77
C. Analysis of PRO Review
The DRGs provided the PROs with a formidable tool for monitoring individual medical decisions. The law requires that, as a
condition of Medicare participation and of receiving money under
the PPS, the hospital must maintain an agreement with a PRO to
monitor a variety of medical decisions.78 "To admit or not to admit," is the threshold question that the PRO asks. Is the hospital
admission "medically necessary"? "Could the patient be effectively treated more economically on an outpatient basis?"7 9 If the
PRO review determines that the treatment could possibly be done
on an outpatient basis, then the patient should not be admitted.
This decision, however, does not take into account the individual's
personal circumstances and ability to recuperate as an outpatient,
which doctors always used to take into consideration.
The PRO also reviews other core medical decisions. One such
decision is the "invasive procedure review." ' Is the doctor performing an invasive procedure which the PRO deems "medically
necessary"?8" Congress charged the PROs with identifying those
invasive procedures which they felt were overused by physicians
and for which payment was customarily too high.82 Many procedures which were the "bread and butter" of some doctors were
targeted as not being "medically justified." It is the contractual
obligation of the PRO to either categorically deny coverage or to
limit it to certain circumstances and certain rates of reimbursement. While this may limit the number of unnecessary surgeries
and invasive diagnostic procedures which are being performed for
financial gain, it also may have a chilling effect on the use of some
procedures which might be legitimately helpful, but which the doctor does not want to order because neither he nor the hospital will
receive reimbursement.83
77. Compare Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law, supra note 72, at 1022, with
Wong & Lincoln, supra note 75 (suggesting that fewer tests will reduce the incidence of
false leads).
78.

42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(F) (Supp. 1988).

79. Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 381 (1982)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1982).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)(A) (1982).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1) (1982).
83. 42 C.F.R. § 417.532 (1987).
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The PROs are also charged with monitoring quality of care.
The statute calls it "Quality

Review." '85

4

The PRO reviews the

"completeness, adequacy and quality of care" provided. 6 To do
this, the PRO reviews the medical records of sample patients and
assesses their inpatient care by comparing it with pre-established
criteria specific to the nature of services provided and the patient's
condition. 87

The PROs also perform a "DRG Validation Review" which
seeks to ascertain whether the principal diagnosis was in fact the
diagnosis responsible for the admission, or whether the diagnosis
has been made in a way to maximize reimbursement from the
Medicare program.88 This provision is aimed at enabling those
paid by the government to monitor the hospital employees charged
with establishing which DRGs are appropriate for patients. The
feared practice that this is designed to protect against is that hospital personnel might err or deliberately falsify the diagnosis so as to
qualify for greater rates of reimbursement under the DRGs.
1.

Expanding Areas of PRO Monitoring

The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
("COBRA") expanded the areas that PROs were authorized to
monitor.89 With the implementation of COBRA, Congress gave
the PROs authority to monitor and review 100% of certain surgical procedures, as well as to review treatment plans and services
rendered in HMOs and Competitive Medical Plans. 90
The Sixth Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
("SOBRA") gives PROs even more power in reviewing quality of
care. This legislation extends PRO review to home health agencies
and skilled nursing facilities. 91
Thus, the PRO has become a major monitoring entity of physicians, with broad-ranging authority. The government is using
PROs to determine if treatments are medically necessary, toward
the end of protecting the integrity of the DRG system. While
84.

42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1982).

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (1982).

89.

Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 151 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.).
90. Id.
91. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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couched in language which makes quality of care appear to be a
priority, there is little doubt that the PROs are the government's
vehicle through which it hopes to gain some control over its selfimposed health care expenditures. The ongoing tension between
the goals of cost-containment and high quality care pervades this
legislation.
2.

How a PRO Works

A nurse or other non-physician carries out the initial review process in most PROs. 92 They decide whether the doctor's decision to
treat a patient in a certain way was "medically necessary." 93 If the
physician wishes to justify his orders, he may do so. Does the
nurse bear any responsibility if the doctor is sued for malpractice?
No. 94 Her concern is paring down costs to Medicare. She then
brings the file to a reviewing physician, who examines the criticized
treatment. Frequently, this physician is not board certified in the
clinical area that he or she is reviewing. The reviewing physician
makes a decision as to the medical necessity of the admission or the
95
treatment and then makes a recommendation to the OIG.
The PRO is not authorized to impose sanctions, but the OIG
does have such authority. The OIG publicizes its decision and notifies all medical societies, state licensing bodies, the Health Care
Financing Administration ("HCFA"), PROs, hospitals, skilled
nursing facilities ("SNFs"), and HMOs.96 The OIG is also entitled
to notify insurance carriers and intermediaries. The only people
who physicians are permitted to inform personally of any sanctions
against them are their p'atients. 97
If a physician strongly objects to the PRO's recommendation,
upon which the OIG's decision is based, he may appeal. 98 Yet the
decision stays in effect during the pendency of the appeal.9 9 Most
cases which have been brought regarding the PRO process have
sought temporary injunctions to stay publication of the OIG's de92. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(5) (1982).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (1982).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6 (1982).
95. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.70 (1987). The sheer process of having a nurse institute such
proceedings is inherently outrageous to most physicians. For lawyers, this process would
be similar to having a paralegal going through a lawyer's files and questioning the validity
of certain motions filed or depositions taken by that lawyer. Such a procedure surely
would be strenuously opposed by the legal profession.
96. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.100 (1987).
97. Id.
98. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.130 (1987).
99. Id.
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cision while the doctor's appeal is pending.' °° The majority of
those cases, however, held that the doctor had received adequate
due process and, therefore, permitted the injunctions to stay in
effect. Io
3.

Review of the Reviewers

If a PRO determines that a doctor erred in his decision to admit,
to provide inpatient treatment, or to perform an invasive procedure, then the PRO must notify the doctor, the hospital, and the
patient, and provide an opportunity for the case to be discussed. 0 2
The PRO decision to deny payment is an "initial denial determina0 3
tion" which can be appealed.1
If the error of the doctor is found to be severe enough, the PRO
has the authority to recommend that the OIG impose harsh sanctions against the physician and/or the hospital. 101 These sanctions
take the form of fines, penalties, a refund of fees, temporary suspension from the program, or, in extreme cases, permanent banishment from the Medicare program. 0 5 Still another level of review
is authorized: any person entitled to Medicare benefits, or any doctor or hospital dissatisfied with the determination made by the
PRO, is entitled to reconsideration, that is, another review by a
qualified peer. 1 6 Guidelines for this reconsideration are outlined
07
in the regulations.1
Further protection is offered a doctor pursuant to an agreement
that was entered into between the HCFA, the AMA, the Association of Retired Persons, and the OIG, which entitles the physician
to due process in all PRO review proceedings. 0 8 When a decision
which is adverse to the doctor receiving reimbursement is rendered, he is entitled to counsel, and he has the right to obtain ex100. See, e.g., Thorbus v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1988); Doyle v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 848 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1988); Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791
(9th Cir. 1987).
101. See supra note 100.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1982).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (1982).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (1982).
105. Legal authority for the sanctioning process is found in: 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5
(1982); Part 1004 of the regulations adopted by the Department of Health and Human
Services, 42 C.F.R. §§ 1004 to 1004.130 (1986); and PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION
MANUAL, PART 6, SANCTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (1985).
106. 42 C.F.R. §§ 1004.1 to 1004.130 (1986).
107. Id.
108. According to a HCFA press release dated May 13, 1987, this AARP-AMAHCFA-OIG agreement is amendment § 602.5 to the PRO Manual.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

pert witnesses, to review the records, and to have the reviewing
physician present at the hearing. 10 9
4. Analysis of the Economic Consequences
of Due Process Safeguards
Now that these safeguards have been placed into the system, it is
likely that the HCFA will be expecting the PROs to bring more
actions against physicians, followed by more due process hearings.11 0 But what the government seeks to save with one hand, it
will spend with the other. Although the government wants to increase lagging enforcement against physicians, towards the end of
ensuring that the Medicare dollars are conservatively spent, the review process itself is exceedingly expensive.11 ' From the government's point of view, it is questionable whether a cost-benefit
analysis would show bottom line cost savings to the Medicare program from the use of PROs and their administrative appeal proceedings. It is more likely that the creation of an additional
bureaucracy will tend to perpetuate and increase expenditures.
From a physician's point of view, availing himself of all the due
process entitlements would pose a particularly burdensome expense. Given the many phases of the PRO review process, and
given the physician's due process entitlements at each step, one can
easily envision this process being too costly and time consuming
for physicians to fully pursue. Unless lawyers are willing to represent physicians on a contingency fee basis, it is likely that they will
109.

Id.

110. It is not only the HCFA which expects more sanctioning. On October 26, 1987,
the Associated Press reported that a study conducted by the Public Citizen Research
Group (a group associated with Ralph Nader and directed by Dr. Sidney Wolfe), revealed that PROs had not sanctioned any doctors in 23 states and the District of Columbia. According to Wolfe, those states "have more than one-fifth of the nation's Medicare
doctors and serve more than six million Medicare beneficiaries." At a hearing in October
1987 before the House Energy and Commerce Health subcommittee, Wolfe stated: "The
failure to use sanctions at all gives the signal that the peer review organization isn't very
serious about doing disciplinary activity."
As of that time, as a result of recommendations made by PROs, the Department of
Health and Human Services had fined 24 doctors and dropped another 53 from the Medicare system since late-1985, when the sanction program began. Another House panel
had released PRO statistics suggesting that there may have been hundreds of thousands
of instances of dangerous care given to Medicare patients since 1985, including up to
22,000 fatal cases.
111.
Money for quality-of-care reviews by PROs was estimated at $468 million for
1986-88. Dr. Thomas Dehn, president of the American Medical Peer Review Association recommended that this amount be doubled, which would bring the PRO budget to
.5% of Medicare spending, far short of the 5% most industries devote to quality control.
Associated Press, Oct. 26, 1987.
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not actively insist on enforcing their due process guarantees
throughout the appeal process. If they did, then the government
would be forced to defend its position, thai is, the sides would polarize; lawyers would be hired and the expenses of such litigation
would rapidly exceed whatever cost savings to the government the
initial PRO sanction was supposed to engender.
Assuring doctors their due process rights makes it likely that
they will need lawyers (guaranteed by the right to counsel) to represent them in the due process hearings on PRO recommendations.
The adversarial legal process will be both an expense and a distasteful distraction to physicians. It is likely that physicians will
accede to PRO recommendations more easily than they would if
such legal expenses were not at stake. Physicians are not trained to
have the same adversarial gusto as lawyers, and cannot be expected
to welcome the opportunity to enter this fray when they are paying
lawyers by the hour. Unless a physician feels that the PROs stance
on a particular medical decision so threatens his future livelihood,
or so increases his chances of being sued for malpractice, it is likely
that the physician will accede to the PROs, if only to avoid the
bureaucratic bother and expense of contesting its decision.112
Prior to the Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, there had
been virtually no restraints on government spending on Medicare/
Medicaid since its inception in 1965.113 The Congressional acts

discussed above, creating entities to monitor medical decisions,
constitute one of the government's desperate efforts to gain some
measure of control over medical spending. In the process, a huge
bureaucracy has arisen for the purpose of monitoring these excesses. That bureaucracy is itself an expense to the government
and, like all bureaucracies, it tends to expand and perpetuate itself.
The succession of acts and regulations augment the domain that
the government will monitor, and thereby augment the bureaucracy performing the monitoring. Furthermore, the intricacies of
the regulations promulgated under these laws require a whole new
group of professionals to administer, decipher, and to assure compliance with or to contest them.
112.

See Mcllrath, All Sides Reporting Complaints About PRO Sanction Process, AM.

NEWS, Nov. 6, 1987, at 1; and Morford, PRO Program Must Continue to be True
Peer Review, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 16, 1987, at 29, for a thorough discussion and analyMED.

sis of peer review. See also Gosfield, PROs: A Case Study in Utilization Management and

Quality Assurance, in 1989

HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK

of PROs.
113. See generally Califano, supra note 6, at 44.

(1989), for additional discussion
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D. More Monitor Mania: Physicians Sanctioning the Physicians
Who Sanction Physicians
If the sheer time and expense of participating in the peer review
process were not sufficient discouragement to physicians, the prospect of the reviewing physician being sued by the reviewed physician for libel, slander, or conspiracy to restrain trade adds yet
another disincentive for physicians to participation in peer review
proceedings.
In the much-publicized case of Patrick v. Burget,"4 the Supreme
Court upheld a multi-million dollar jury verdict against a physician who had been involved in peer review activities.I 5 The defendant physician who revoked the surgical privileges of a local
surgeon was found to have violated the antitrust laws, thereby in-6
curring treble damages amounting to over two million dollars."
The verdict generated a great deal of alarm and caused some physicians to decide that participating in hospital peer review was not
worth the risk. It also gave physicians who suffered from adverse
peer review actions the impetus to go to court to challenge those
actions.
Whether or not the Patrick case does in fact pose an imminent
risk of antitrust liability to physicians participating in peer review
activities is questionable. Patrick is factually unusual and distinguishable from most cases on this issue because in the small town
in Oregon where Dr. Patrick practiced, there were only two surgeons and one of them participated in the peer review that ultimately denied surgical privileges at the hospital to Dr. Patrick.'I
The anti-competitive result of that peer review activity was clear:
without surgical privileges, Dr. Patrick could not operate, leaving
the other surgeon to monopolize the specialty in that town and
surrounding area." 8 Also, Dr. Patrick had refused to join the reviewing doctor's group practice.'
It was easy for the jury and the
reviewing Court to find an anti-competitive motive of the doctor
making the peer review decision.
However, neither physicians nor health-care legislators bothered
to distinguish the Patrick case from the more usual situations.
Across the country, repercussions from the Patrick decision led to
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
Id. at 1666.
Id.
Id. at 1659.
Id. at 1661, 1666.
Id. at 1659.
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fears that participation in good faith peer review could leave a physician open to multi-million dollar liability. 2 0° The fear of treble
damages would deter many physicians from participating in peer
review activities.
E.

The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
In another effort to give the peer review process a boost, and in
order to counter the alarm generated by the treble damage verdict
in the Patrick case, Congress passed the Health Care Quality Im2
provement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA").' '
The HCQIA went into effect in November 1986 for the express
purpose of encouraging doctors to participate in peer review activities. 22 The idea behind it was that the government could improve
the quality of care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are incompetent or engage in unprofes23
sional conduct. 1
One of the expressed assumptions of this law is that actual medical malpractice, not merely malpractice litigation, is increasing and
that professional review can remedy that problem. 24 Although the
name of the statute emphasizes the "quality improvement" aspect
120. See Tambone v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, Inc., 825 F.2d 1132 (7th
Cir. 1987). The Tambone court stated that in the absence of "active state supervision" by
Illinois in the peer review process, doctors participating in peer review were not immune
from federal antitrust liability under the "state action doctrine" exemption from the Sherman Act. Id. at 1135.
In spite of a state statute purporting to protect the participant in peer review from civil
liability for damages arising out of the peer review process, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111,
para. 4406, amended by P.A. 85-661 (effective Sept. 20, 1987), the doctor could still be
held liable in a federal antitrust action under the Tambone decision.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. 1986).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (Supp. 1986).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11151 (Supp. 1986).
124. Section 11101 provides as follows:
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrants greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State.
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians
to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's
previous damaging or incompetent performance.
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective professional
peer review.
(4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional review.
(5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection
for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
42 U.S.C. § 11101 (Supp. 1986).
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of the legislation, it is clear that the act was also passed to help the
government ease the way for physician input into the PROs which
are monitoring the use of DRGs, the government's major cost-saving vehicle.
To that end, this act introduced a new body of legislation which
sought to create immunities (primarily from antitrust liability, but
also from libel or slander) for physicians who participated in peer
review organizations and activities. 125 The HCQIA provides immunity from damages under "any federal or state law" to two different categories of entities. One immunity is for those individual
physicians who provide information to a "professional review
body"' 126 regarding the competence or professional conduct of a
physician. "127 The other immunity is for the entities who take pro28
fessional review actions against physicians.
A "professional review activity" is any activity of a health care
entity which determines whether an individual physician may have
a medical staff appointment or clinical privileges, and whether
1 29
those privileges will be renewed, revoked, changed, or modified.
In order for the immunities to be effective, the professional review
actions must meet certain specified standards of reasonableness
and due process. '3 0 If an individual physician participates in a peer
review activity, he will be protected from damage suits as long as
the action taken by the reviewing body was taken in accordance
with certain standards.' 3 '
1.

Impact of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act

The HCQIA is another body of legislation which seeks to protect and validate the already existing PRO legislation, which in
turn, is responsible for monitoring the DRG system. That earlier
legislative system would be worthless without the unfettered coop125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111, 11112 (Supp. 1986).
126. A "professional review body" is defined as any health care entity, any governing
body of the health care entity, or any committee of the health care entity which conducts
professional review activity. 42 U.S.C. § 11151 (11) (Supp. 1986).
127. 42 U.S.C. § lllll(a)(2) (Supp. 1986).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1 llll(a)(1) (Supp. 1986).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (Supp. 1986).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (Supp. 1986).
131. Those standards are that the action was taken: (1) in the reasonable belief that
the action was in furtherance of quality health care; (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain
the facts of the matter; (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to
the physician involved; and (4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by
the facts known. 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (Supp. 1986).
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eration of local physicians. Thus, the HCQIA attempts to support
the PROs.
A real question with regard to the HCQIA is whether the immunities it provides will be sufficient to encourage physicians to actively participate in peer review functions, both in PROs and in
peer reviewing entities in their hospitals. Also, will that peer review be used to further the government's purposes (i.e., no medically unnecessary admissions)? Soon after its passage, it appears
that this law may very well not have its intended effect.
Under the HCQIA, a physician who participates in peer review
activities cannot be held liable to the doctor who is the target of the
review on any grounds except those arising under the civil rights
statutes. 3 2 The law itself contains exceptions for civil rights based
actions, wherein the immunities it provides will not be in effect.' 3 3
One possible conclusion of this is that any doctor participating in
peer review action which curtails the hospital privileges of a foreign-born, black, Hispanic, or female physician can be personally
liable to that physician for damages that arise from an abridgment
of that physician's civil rights.' 34 If the targeted physician is a
white male, then his reviewer can commit libel, slander, and antitrust violations, and, under this legislation, will be immune from
damages.
The physician is left with a choice between participating in peer
review and risking personal liability, or not participating in peer
review and indirectly risking the hospital incurring liability for
negligent credentialing or respondeat superior. Why would any
sane physician participate in recommending summary action
against a doctor who falls into a class of people protected under
civil rights statutes? The HCQIA gives to any doctor whose privileges are suspended or revoked a blueprint of just how his reviewers can be personally liable to him. 35 In the broad exceptions that
it carves out, the HCQIA may very well defeat its own purpose by
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1 lIl(a)(1) (Supp. 1986).
133. Id. The immunities will not apply "under any law of the United States or any
State relating to the Civil Rights of any person or persons, including the Civil Rights Act
of 1984, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. and the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C 1981 et seq." Id.
134. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986)
wherein a Korean-born female physician claimed that her hospital staff privileges had
been revoked because of her race, and sought damages from the hospital, the board of
directors, the president of the medical staff, and the members of the executive committee
of the medical staff. Id. at 413, 418. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that she
could bring a claim under Title VII against her "peer reviewers." Id. at 425.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1lll1(a), (b) (Supp. 1986).
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ensuring a chilly response by physicians to peer review activities. 136
Either a reviewing doctor would have to actually benefit by an adverse outcome against another doctor (e.g., financial, political, or
administrative benefit), or the physician being reviewed would have
to have committed indisputably egregious wrongs, for participation
to be worth the aggravation and possible legal consequences. On
the other hand, by immunizing certain participants in peer review
from antitrust liability, the government may be paving the way for
malicious, anti-competitive uses of the PRO process.
2.

Creation of New Databank to Monitor Physicians

Perhaps even more significant from a "monitor mania" point of
view is the provision of the HCQIA which provides for the creation of a national data bank for monitoring physicians. 13 7 It establishes a national depository -

a type of clearinghouse -

of

information regarding all physicians who have been subject to disciplinary or other actions for incompetence or professional misconduct.13 It requires that a "health care entity,"' 39 including
medical malpractice insurers," hospitals,' 4 ' and state medical licensing boards, 11 2 report all payments made in settlement or satisfaction of malpractice claims against physicians, in addition to
reporting any corrective action which is taken against the physician (such as denial, revocation, suspension of staff privileges or
any disciplinary or other action for incompetence or professional
misconduct) to the state licensure boards. 14 3 The state licensure
boards, in turn, have to report these and any other actions they
might take on a doctor's license. I" Failure to make such a report
to this national repository can cause the immunity created in the
136. The statute provides clearly delineated circumstances under which certain participants in the peer review actions will not be liable for damages under any law of the
United States with respect to such peer review action. 42 U.S.C. § 1 lll(a)(1) (Supp.
1986). The statute specifically excludes certain types of actions from immunity: civil
rights actions; actions initiated by governmental agencies; and actions by disciplined physicians for injunctive or declaratory relief for reinstatement of hospital privileges. Id.
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11137 (Supp. 1986).
138. Id.
139. A "health care entity" is defined broadly to include all licensed hospitals,
HMOs, group medical practices, preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"), and any
other entity which provides health care services and follows formal peer review for quality assurance. 42 U.S.C. § 11 151(4)(A) (Supp. 1986).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (Supp. 1986).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1) (Supp. 1986).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 11132 (Supp. 1986).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 11136 (Supp. 1986).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 11133(b) (Supp. 1986).
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other sections of the HCQIA to be lost.'4
The third part of the HCQIA gives particular legal importance
to the data bank which will be generated by the reporting requirements. Pursuant to the HCQIA, hospitals are required to make an
inquiry into the national depository for each new physician who
applies for appointment to its medical staff or requests clinical
privileges.' 46 Other doctors on the staff must be "checked out"
every two years. 147 The risk of not making this inquiry is that the
hospital will be presumed to be on notice of any information con48
tained in the data bank.

Although not specifically designed for this purpose, this section
of the HCQIA creating the data bank will have a profound impact
on medical malpractice cases. It will provide plaintiffs and their
lawyers with a legal vehicle for bringing in the hospital in a malpractice action against a physician on the staff, on the grounds of
"negligent credentialing."' 4 9 If a hospital grants staff privileges to
a physician who has been sanctioned in any way, who has settled a
malpractice suit anywhere in the country (regardless of liability),
who has had disciplinary proceedings instituted against him by any
hospital or state board, who faces any adverse Medicare rulings, or
who has been temporarily suspended for any reason, then that hospital might be guilty of negligent credentialing in any malpractice
suit which might arise when that doctor is practicing at that hospital.' 50 "You [the hospital] were on notice that this physician might
tend to be negligent, and you should have known better than to
hire him," the plaintiff will say; thereby implicating the hospital
and gaining access to its "deep pocket." '51
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

42 U.S.C. § 11133(c) (Supp. 1986).

42 U.S.C. § 11135 (Supp. 1986).
42 U.S.C. § 11135(a)(2) (Supp. 1986).
42 U.S.C. § 11135(b) (Supp. 1986).
See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 11135(b) (Supp. 1986).
151. A letter in the NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE voiced another concern
about other potential problems which such a "big brother" data bank will pose:
For example, a competent physician who has been sued, perhaps frivolously,
and who settles the case out of court at the insistence of his insurance carrier
would be noted as having been involved in a question of malpractice. If that
physician decided to move to a more rural part of the country - where there
was relatively little malpractice litigation and where competition for patients
was keen - the local peer review board might decide to withhold hospital privileges under the guise of maintaining high standards of medical care in the community. This anticompetitive action is exempt from antitrust laws under the
new statute.
317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1353 (1987).
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The effect of this is that hospitals will be extremely reluctant to
grant staff privileges to any physician whose staff privileges have
been terminated anywhere. From the physician's perspective, this
national data bank will facilitate "blackballing" of physicians.
Once privileges have been terminated at one hospital, the physician
will have an extremely difficult time relocating at any other
hospital.
F

Government Monitoring of Physician Fees

Another area of monitoring physicians into which the government has inserted itself is physician's fees. The Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984152 created the "Medicare Participating Physician Program," which basically established a contract between the government and doctors who treat Medicare/Medicaid patients. 15 3 In
return for participating in the Medicare/Medicaid program (by receiving money from the government), the physician had to agree
that he would accept assignment for goods and services reimbursed
by Medicare/Medicaid, and that he would not charge more to
Medicare/Medicaid patients than Medicare/Medicaid reimburses
on those cases.' 54 The statutory reimbursement formulas are complex and vary from doctor to doctor, depending on what the doctor
has charged historically and what Medicare has determined to be
the "prevailing charge" for that treatment.' 5 The Act also created
a fee freeze for a one-year period and provided disincentives to
non-participating doctors, such as reduced coverage of their
56

patients. 1

152. Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. B, tit. III, 98 Stat. 494, 1061 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
153. Id.
154. Incentives for physicians to join the participating physician program, and accept
as payment in full what they receive from Medicare, include government publication of a
list advertising physicians who participate. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L
No. 98-369, div. B, title III, § 2306(c), 98 Stat. 494, 1071. At the time this law was
passed, it was estimated that 30-50% of all doctors charged their patients more than
Medicare's reimbursement fee. See Bitter Pills for Medicare, TIME, July 9, 1984, at 21.
155. The operational rules regarding what services are covered by Medicare Part B,
who may provide them, the formulas by which Medicare reimbursement amounts are to
be determined, and how payment is made are found in the Regulations of the Health
Care Financing Administration, 42 C.F.R. Chapter IV, and the Medicare Part B Carriers
Manual, issued as the HCFA Publication 14-3. The Medicare Regulations have the force
of law, but the Carriers Manual does not. Its instructions are, however, binding on carriers as part of their contract with HCFA.
For a thorough discussion of the intricacies of these regulatory provisions, see Weiland,

Medicare Reimbursement of Physicians, in 1989

HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK

(A. Gosfield

ed. 1989).
156. This original fee freeze has been extended various times. They have always met
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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts ("OBRA") of 1986' s7
and 1987 Is8 brought further refinements to the participating physician program, making it more complicated to administer, and fostering more reimbursement disputes.159 Because approximately
fifty million people are covered by Medicare/Medicaid, 60 refusal
to play by the government's rules puts a doctor at a significant
disadvantage. Some doctors strive to maintain a practice purely
comprised of privately insured or self-paying patients so as to not
have to bother with the government monitoring. But it is difficult
to exclude from one's practice all people over age sixty-five and all
people on Medicaid. Such a practice is not only discriminatory
and contrary to the Hippocratic oath, but it excludes a substantial
percentage of the potential patient population.
The salient point of these acts is that they demonstrate more
examples of the government flexing its monitoring muscle against
doctors, toward the ostensible end of saving money. In so doing,
the government has set up another bureaucracy and generated a
whole category of litigation over reimbursement disputes which
with resistance from a medical community which has grown accustomed to charging
their patients a portion of the fee over and above what Medicare covers. For discussions
of the pay formulas and the fee freezes, see Friedland, Doctors Shunning Medicare, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 7, 1984, § II (N.J. Supp.), at I, col. 5; Pear, U.S. Imposes Freeze on Physician's Medicare Fees, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1984, at B12, col. 3.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (Supp. 1986). For regulations implementing the reimbursement formula, see 42 C.F.R. § 410.152 (1989).
158. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330.
159. For a thorough discussion of the myriad of reimbursement issues and disputes
generated by this legislation, see AMA v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1988). In
Bowen, seven doctors and three medical societies representing physicians nationally challenged the provisions of section 9331 of OBRA of 1986 which changed the prior "reasonable charge" basis of reimbursement to substitute a new "maximum allowable actual
charge" ("MAAC"), 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(j)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. 1986). Bowen, 857 F.2d at
268-69. The MAAC required an individual calculation by every physician for every medical service. Id. at 269. The court did acknowledge that "[t]o say that the calculation of
individual MAACs by every physician for every medical service that may be performed
(some 10,000 in all) is complex is to understate the matter ridiculously." Id. The court,
however, declined to rule on the challenge, leaving the complex reimbursement formulas
for physicians and their accountants to wrestle with. Id. at 272. For a discussion of
legislation and how it affects physicians, see Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1987); AMA v. Bowen, 659 F. Supp. 1143
(N.D. Tex. 1987). See also Deel v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1988); Burlington
Memorial Hosp. v. Bowen, 644 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
For problems and disputes arising from calculating Medicaid rates of reimbursement,
see Virginia Hospital Association v. Balles, 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989). See also Bowen
v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Isaacs v. Bowen, 865
F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1989) (challenging the Medicare reimbursement procedures from the
claimant's perspective).
160. In 1986, 31,768,000 people enrolled in Medicare and 22,337,000 enrolled in
Medicaid. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 6, at table 578.
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arise out of the complex statutory provisions upon which payment
and the differing rates of payment of physicians depend.' 6' Certainly, whatever money that might be saved by the provisions of
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and OBRA 16 2 is eaten up, if not
exceeded by the sheer expense of administering the complex program and defending the government's position in the disputes
which arise under it.
1. Impact of the "Medicare Participating Physician Program"
For physicians, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 has imposed
unfair, confusing, incomprehensible, and burdensome reimbursement formulas, prompting one court to dismiss the reimbursement
formulas as something that "only legislators and accountants can
appreciate."'' 63 In its regulation of physician's fees, the government has created a statutory morass." 6 The laws not only distract
and outrage current medical practitioners, but they exert a farreaching impact on future generations of physicians. As one reporter noted: "Given the intricacy, intrusiveness and constant
fluctuations of these price control measures, it is no wonder that
top students are being deterred in droves from applying to medical
65
schools." 1
The difficulties and inequities generated by these variable formulas prompted the federal government to suggest the instituting of
DRG-type flat fees for physicians and the services they perform.
161. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the payment
provisions of the OBRA of 1986 and 1987.
162. Because Medicare paid out $35,699,000 in 1980, and $75,997,000 in 1986, and
Medicaid paid out $23,311,000 in 1980, and $40,805,000 in 1986, the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984 had a minimal impact, if any, on government expenditures.
163. Bowen, 857 F.2d at 269.
164. To get a sense of the mirky depths of this morass, note the following:
Each doctor's MAACs must be calculated for each procedure he performs for a
Medicare patient. First, the doctor must determine whether he submitted
charges to Medicare for the particular service (classified from among approximately 10,000 service codes) in the second quarter of 1984. If so, his MAAC
for that base period on that service is computed by comparing his actual charge
billed to Medicare patients during that base period with 115% of the current
year's 'prevailing charge.' The 'prevailing charge,' in turn, depends on the 1973
rate for services updated by the Medicare Economic Index and adjusted locally
by Medicare carriers on a procedure-by-procedure basis. The carriers normally
maintain 'prevailing charge' information. If a doctor finds that his 1984 base
period actual charge equals or exceeds 115% of the prevailing charge for nonparticipating physicians, the MAAC is 101% of the base period charge. 42
U.S.C. § 1395u (j)(1)(C). If his base period actual charge is less than 115% of
the prevailing charge, a different formula applies.
Id. at 269 n.3. And the variations are endless.
165. Id. (citing N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1988, § 1, at 1).
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However, the prospect of a prospective payment system for physicians was virtually abandoned because of the insurmountable difficulties in arriving at fair fees based on diagnoses. The AMA is
currently working with the federal government in preparing a comprehensive fee schedule for physician procedures which takes into
account factors such as the difficulty of the medical service, the
cost to the physician, his/her expenses (i.e., rent), and his/her
number of years of education and training.166 It is hoped that such
a fee schedule will be fair to physicians, and will enable the government to have a predictable, fixed rate of reimbursement for physician services.
G.

Government Monitoring of Physician Contracts. Medicare
Fraud and Abuse Statutes

The Medicare fraud and abuse statutes' 67 constitute another
large, complex body of legislation which attacks practices that tend
to expand the costs to the government from the Medicare/Medicaid programs."' As noted previously, the PRO program seeks to
monitor costs by standardizing them and ensuring that those standards, DRGs, are properly adhered to. 6 9 The reimbursement laws
discussed in the above section seek to enable the government to get
a handle on rates of physician reimbursement. The fraud and
abuse statutes, on the other hand, seek to suppress referral fees or
any other arrangements which tend to encourage the ordering of
goods or services for which payment may be made under Medicaid
or Medicare. 70 The purpose behind the fraud and abuse statutes is
to protect the Medicare/Medicaid program from overuse by health
166.
167.
168.
See, e.g.,

AMA, Dep't of Federal Legislation.
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1983).
Many articles and periodicals thoroughly discuss the intricacies of these statutes.
Anderson, Medical Profession Perspective, in MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE: UNDERSTANDING THE LAW, 129-32 (1986); Teplitzky, Holden & Sollins, Medicare and
Medicaid Fraudand Abuse, in 1989 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK (A. Gosfield ed. 1989);
Hyman & Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives in a "Competitive"
Health Care Era, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1133 (1988).

169.

See supra notes 44-77 and accompanying text.

170.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. 1986). The basic principles embodied in the

legislation are prohibitions against practices which tend to encourage the use of the Medicare/Medicaid program. Practices prohibited are those which:
(1) Offer payment, solicitation, or receipt of any remuneration for:
(a) Referral of patient for furnishing of items or services for which payment
may be made under Medicare or Medicaid; and
(b) Purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made under Medicare or Medicaid.
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care providers.' 7 '

At a time when hospitals and HMOs are feeling a financial
squeeze, there is real competition among hospitals to lure onto
their staffs doctors who have large practices with patients who can
pay privately or who present profiles of the kind of patient from
which the hospital can make a profit from their DRG reimbursement. 7 2 Hospitals have devised infinitely variable incentive programs as a physician recruitment tool, and it is these programs which contain little or no element of fraud or abuse - that are
regulated by the fraud and abuse statutes' 73 because they can be
interpreted as arrangements which encourage utilization of the
Medicare program.
Similarly, hospitals and doctors have entered into physician-hospital joint venture arrangements which have come under the purview of the fraud and abuse statutes inasmuch as they often
encourage investor-physicians to refer patients to the hospital.'74
The government's sense of urgency in examining these arrange171. The protection afforded may be too little, too late, because billions have already
been bilked from the system, with a variety of culprits. A recent task force including
members of the Justice Department, the HCFA, and the OIG of the DHHS have recently
uncovered what may be the largest financial scandal in the history of Medicare: "the
misspending of as much as $10 billion in Medicare funds over the past six years." Pound
& Bogdanich, Has Medicare Paid Out Billions Actually Owed by Private Insurers,Wall St.
J., Apr. 7, 1989, at 1, col. 6. That article points out that approximately one million
people have this coverage: they are over the age of 65 and qualify for Medicare, and they
remain on the job and are eligible for private health insurance. Id. Although Medicare is
supposed to only be a "secondary insurer," and pay only for expenses not covered by
private insurance, Medicare continues to pay many claims that should have been covered
by private insurers, including workers' compensation, accident insurance, and group
health plans. The administration of Medicare, however, has often been turned over to the
very insurance companies that stood to benefit from the erroneous overpayments (i.e.,
they pay less if Medicare overpays). Those companies have "overlooked" Medicare overpayments that benefit them. Id.
172. See Perry, US. Hospitals Wooing Superstar Physicians, 18 MODERN HEALTH
CARE 24 (Jan. 1988).
173. See GAO REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH, COMMITTEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R., MEDICARE; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PAYMENTS BY HosPITALS COULD LEAD TO ABUSE, GAO/HRD-86-103 (July 1986). See Dechene, Hospital
Programs to Attract and Retain Physicians, in 1989 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK, for a
thorough discussion of the statutory constraints on physician recruitment arrangements.
174. Hyman & Williamson, supra note 168, at 1149. See also Burda, Law Aimed at
Curbing Medicare Fraud May Have Chilling Effect on Joint Ventures, 17 MODERN
Another regulator, the Internal Revenue Service, also
HEALTHCARE 92 (Oct. 9, 1987).
examines those joint venture contracts (primarily from the hospital's perspective) to see if
they are in furtherance of the hospital's general, charitable purpose, or if they are primarily for the benefit of a private individual (profit for the health care provider), in which
case the contract might threaten the hospital's tax-exempt status as a charity. See I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2), 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1986). See also
Bromberg, Tax Exemption and Public Charity Status. An Update on Current Develop-
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ments is supported by a recent study, conducted by the Department of Health and Human Services, which showed that
physician-joint venturers and investors in laboratories order 45%
more lab tests for their Medicare patients than do the rest of the
physicians, who have no financial incentive to do so.'
Thus, the fraud and abuse laws provide the government with a
vehicle to monitor the contractual relationships between doctors
and institutions.' 7 6 The ingenuity of lawyers has been taxed, and
numerous seminars are held on how to structure physician recruitment, incentive programs, and joint ventures between physicians
and health care organizations so as to simultaneously skirt the constraints of the fraud and abuse laws and not jeopardize the hospital's charitable tax status.' 77
In order to help interpret and construe the fraud and abuse statutes, various governmental agencies issue regulations, guidelines,
and letters to give guidance to health care providers. There are
Medicare manuals,7 8 and intermediary letters from HHS'71 9 and
HCFA. 18 ° In addition, the passage of the Medicare and Medicaid
ments, outline of speech given at the 1988 National Health Lawyers Association Conven-

tion (Chicago, Ill. May 15-17, 1988).
175. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Financial Arrangements Between Physicians and Health Care Businesses. Report to Congress, OA1-12-88-01410 (Gov't Printing Office Apr. 28, 1989); Spencer, Doctors Order
More Tests If They Own Labs, Wash. Post, Apr. 29, 1989.
176. Glenn, Lawler & Hoerl, Physician Referrals in a Competitive Environment; An
Estimate of the Economic Impact of a Referral, 258 J.A.M.A. 1920 (1987).
177. See Bromberg supra note 174. See also Dechene, supra note 173, at 467;
Teplitzky, Fraudand Abuse in the Medical Staff Setting, Speech to ABA, Section on Tort
and Insurance Practice, "Medical Staff Update" (Chicago, Ill. Nov. 11-12, 1989); National Health Lawyers Ass'n Convention, Tax Planningfor Nonprofit Health Care Organizations (San Francisco, Cal. Oct. 12-13, 1989).
178. Medicare manuals are provided by HCFA to intermediaries and carriers who
administer payments to hospitals and physicians. The manuals contain guidelines for all
aspects of the Medicare program.
179. Intermediary letters are policy statements from HHS and HCFA to carriers and
intermediaries intended to alert them as to activities, if discovered, which should be reported to HCFA.
180. The Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 13,170 (1988) states the mission of
Health Care Financing Administration:
to administer the Medicare and Medicaid programs and related provisions of
the Social Security Act in a manner which (1) promotes the timely and economic delivery of appropriate quality health care to eligible beneficiaries, (2)
promotes beneficiary awareness of the services for which they are eligible and
improves the accessibility of those services and (3) promotes efficiency and quality within the total health care delivery system.
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Patient and Program Protection Act ("MMPPPA")"8 ' created authority in the Secretary 1of
HHS to issue regulations specifying legal
82
payment arrangements.
From the physician's perspective, these agencies and their varying policies and interpretations of law present a convoluted, confusing and constantly fluctuating notion of which practices are
legal and which are not. The physician's freedom to enter into
contracts which might ordinarily appear to be a purely capitalistic
response to a competitive squeeze is sharply curtailed by these extensive laws. Both hospitals and doctors are "hamstrung"83 from
responding and adapting freely to difficult financial times.
This vast body of legislation, and the continuously-evolving regulations promulgated under it, constitute a maze-like body of
regulations which intrude into the most private business affairs of
physicians. The many entities involved in promulgating regulations and those which have arisen to assist in compliance with
them make it doubtful whether these laws are accomplishing their
purpose of saving the government money and sharply curtailing
the overutilization and abuse of the Medicaid/Medicare
entitlements. 184
V.

A.

PRIVATE ASSOCIATION MONITORING

The American Medical Association: Physicians
Monitoring Physicians

The AMA tries to represent the best interests of the medical profession. 185 Understandably, the AMA has been less than enthusias181. Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 680 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
182. Id.
183. See Burda, supra note 174; Teplitzky, Avoiding Fraud and Abuse Problems in
Joint Ventures, 4 HEALTH SPAN 17 (Jan. 1987); see also Schorr, Health Care Business
Deals: Kickbacks or Capitalism? HEALTH POL'Y WEEK SPECIAL REP. 3 (Apr. 11,
1988).
184. Hyman & Williamson, supra note 168, at 1195. Hyman and Williamson conclude that enforcement of all the regulations under the fraud and abuse statutes is
"counterproductive and will impede the restructuring of the health care industry along
more efficient and cost-effective lines." Id.
For a practitioner's guide to the fraud and abuse statutes, see Teplitzky, Holden &
Sollins, supra note 168.
185. Historically, the AMA was dedicated to the education of physicians and the
improvement of the quality of medical practice in the United States. It was the AMA
which originated the notion of accreditation of medical institutions, and it was one of the
founding members of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (currently
known as the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Health Care Organizations). AMA,
Division of Quality Assurance.
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tic about the federal government's aggressive entrance into the field
of regulating physicians. 186 That entrance bespeaks a criticism
that not only have physicians failed to adequately police themselves, but the state government who is charged with policing them
has not done so adequately. This federal governmental interference was precisely what the AMA feared when it87 originally opposed Medicare and Medicaid in the early 1960s.1
One area of governmental regulation which is particularly objectionable to physicians is the government's assumption of a role in
adjudging competence of physicians, and setting up bureaucratic
systems which claim to monitor competence. 8 In an effort to
stave off further governmental intrusion into the problems of
"weeding out" incompetent physicians, and also in response to accusations that doctors have not done enough to police their own
ranks, 189 the AMA has recently increased its involvement in physician monitoring.
In 1986, the AMA introduced a new, updated data file, known
as the "Masterfile," which contains information about individual
physicians, including hospital disciplinary proceedings as well as
actions by state boards and DHHS. 190 Plans for this data bank
preceded the Health Care Quality Impriovement Act data bank,
which will contain much of the same information.91
The AMA also took steps in 1986 to monitor so-called "impaired" physicians: those with alcohol and drug problems, as well
as mental illness. 192 It began a three-year program to develop a
186.

See Federal Role in MD Licensure Chilling, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 8, 1988, at

23.
187. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Despite the AMA's original opposition to the federal government's interference with the practive of medicine, the AMA
quite clearly wants the federal government to keep up its funding role - there can be no
turning back to the days when doctors treated all indigents free of charge - but it bridles
at the extent to which governmental bureaucracies seem to be invading medical domains.
188. See supra Section IV for a discussion of governmental regulations.
189. This is a frequent claim of plaintiff lawyers and consumer groups who argue that
the rise in malpractice litigation in the last 15 years is attributable to an actual increase in
medical malpractice, due to a failure of doctors to self-police. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text. This claim was written into the introduction to the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act, though no effort was made to substantiate it. See supra notes
121-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the HCQIA.
190. See American Medical Association Board of Trustees, AMA Initiative on Quality
of Medical Care and Professional Self-Regulation, 256 J.A.M.A. 1036 (1986).
191. See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the data bank
requirements of the HCQIA.
192. See A New Program to Assist Impaired Physicians, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 4,
1986, at 4.
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data base on impaired physicians.' 93 The goal of the program is to
better define what "impairment" actually is, and to foster research
and control programs. 194

In addition, the AMA is working on quality of care guidelines;
in effect, setting basic standards for medical care. To this end, a
new department has been set up, whose goals are to specify what
are appropriate standards of care (i.e., protocols). 95 Currently,
two bills relating to the development of such practice guidelines are
before Congress. 96 The AMA, which in this situation is probably
representative of virtually all physicians in America, feels that the
development of medical practice guidelines, if they must be standardized, should be done by physicians - not nurses or medical
paraprofessionals, and certainly not government bureaucrats.
The AMA is also in the process of setting up uniform fee schedules for procedures. Whereas DRGs are prospective, based on the
experiences of hundreds of hospitals around the country, what constitutes a fair fee for physicians must be evaluated in terms of the
level of training and expertise necessary to perform it, the difficulty
of the procedure, the rent, the office expenses, and a variety of
other factors. The AMA, while protesting the application of
DRGs by the federal government to physicians, has come up with
an alternative fixed payment fee schedule that it hopes will more
accurately represent a fair fee, for Medicare purposes, than the
government would otherwise impose on them.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Dr. John Kelly at the AMA heads the Quality Assurance Department which is
responsible for creating these protocols. According to Dr. Kelly, lawyers are afraid that
these standards will create legal standards of care which can be used against physicians in
malpractice litigation, but this is not their intended purpose. Their purpose is to enumerate specific steps that should be taken by medical practitioners in different specialties
when faced with different medical problems. The AMA, in conjunction with specialist
medical societies, is undertaking a vast, comprehensive development of practice guidelines which will set basic standards for medical care. Dr. Kelly stated that there is evidence that when such protocols exist, and physicians follow them, quality of care goes up
and malpractice goes down.
196. The Gradison and Stark Bill, introduced April 5, 1989, calls for government
funding of a program for developing medical practice guidelines. H.R. 1692, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). This bill authorizes the Secretary of the DHHS to develop those
practice guidelines. Id. The Mitchell Bill, currently before the Senate, proposes government funding for a Patient Outcomes Assessment Program and the creation of a practice
guidelines development program. S. 2702, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 338
(1989).
According to Dr. John Kelly of the AMA, see supra note 195, the AMA supports the
Mitchell Bill because it allows physician organizations to set their own practice
guidelines.
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While the AMA is trying on the one hand to prevent the government from deciding what are fair fees by forming its own fair fee
formulas, on the other hand it wants the government to stay involved in "shelling out" money for doctors. In fact, the AMA consistently takes positions that require more government money: it
asks for increases in physician reimbursement rates for Medicaid
patients,' 97 as well as for funding for the creation of the medical
practice guidelines.'
B.

Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations. Ensuring that Hospitals
Monitor Physicians

The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health-Care Organizations ("Joint Commission") is a private, not-for-profit organization which traditionally has set standards for hospital
management. It gives an official "stamp of approval" accreditation
to hospitals which comply with its extensive guidelines on how
hospitals and medical protocol in such hospitals should be managed.' 99 The Joint Commission publishes a manual that sets out
guidelines that hospitals must follow in order to receive accreditation by that organization. 2 " These guidelines are primarily concerned with the policies and procedures which are followed in the
structure and operations of hospitals and other health-care organizations.2"' Their concern is efficiency of operation, quality of
health care, and the creation of systems and procedures which will
most likely foster those ends.2"2
Almost every section of the manual directly impinges on some
aspect of monitoring of physicians. The quality assurance obligations of a hospital constitute the most comprehensive monitoring
mandates of the Joint Commission. As a prerequisite to accreditation, the Joint Commission requires that a hospital or health care
organization have an "ongoing quality assurance program designed
to objectively and systematically monitor and evaluate the quality
and appropriateness of patient care, pursue opportunities to im197. See Expansion of Medicaid is Proposed,supra note 15.
198. See supra note 196.
199. See Roberts, Coale & Redman, A History of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations,258 J.A.M.A. 936 (1987) for a thorough discussion of
the role of the Joint Commission and the monitoring functions it provides.
200.

JOINT COMMISSION

ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZA-

TIONS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL

201.
202.

Id.
Id.

(1988) [hereinafter

ACCREDITATION MANUAL].
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prove patient care, and resolve identified problems. 20 3
In addition, the Joint Commission requires hospitals to have administrative mechanisms which monitor and evaluate virtually
every aspect of all activities that take place in a hospital - from
surgical case reviews, monitoring of radiological services, ambulatory care services, emergency room services, pathology and laboratory services, and medical record keeping, to monitoring and
evaluating of staff appointments.2 ° Physicians and their medical
performance are most directly monitored via the required quality
assurance, utilization review, credentialing and staff reappointment, and reappraisal reviewing entities, which are usually medical
staff committees. Thus, the Joint Commission is monitoring the
hospital to ensure that the hospital has mechanisms in place for the
adequate monitoring of physicians. °5
VI.

PRIVATE INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING

Compliance with the Joint Commission standards brings a hospital accreditation, but in addition, a hospital must comply with
local state licensing laws in order to receive a license. Virtually all
states have hospital licensing acts which delineate the systems
which must be in place in hospitals for the review and monitoring
of physician decisions as a condition for licensure of hospitals.20 6
When put into practice, these systems constitute another host of
entities in the private institution which have the same basic raison
d'etre as many of the above-discussed monitoring entities: to monitor physicians, their decisions, their treatment plans, and their
practices.
A.

Hospital/Health-CareProvider Institution
as Reviewer of Physicians
In order to comply with state licensing laws, the Joint Commission and federally mandated DRGs (reviewed by PROs), hospitals
and other health care providers have had to adapt and alter their
administrative procedures to encourage doctors to do less, rather
than more medical procedures. To do so, monitoring entities
203. Id. at 235.
204. For the full gamut of monitoring and evaluating committees and mechanisms
which are required within a hospital, see id.
205. The Accreditation Manual provides the most exhaustive and detailed guidelines
for setting up hospitals. It is a Bible for any hospital administrator, hospital lawyer, or
hospital management consultant.
206. See, e.g., Illinois Hospital Licensing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras.
141-157 (1989).
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which already existed for risk management objectives (and to comply with Joint Commission standards) began to assume the role of
"in-house" monitoring of physicians' practice patterns. The committees in hospitals - credentials committee, quality assurance
committee, medical staff association, executive committee, utilization review committees - all conduct professional review activities. They were already in existence to help monitor quality of care
to try to minimize risks of liability to hospitals in medical malpractice situations. Now, their orientation has been forced to have a
decidedly financial objective as well.
1. Credentialing and Quality Assurance: Physicians and Nurses
on Staff Reviewing Physicians on Staff
As a prerequisite to obtaining malpractice insurance, and in order to receive accreditation and comply with applicable state laws,
health care provider organizations must maintain committees of
their medical staff whose purpose is to review the credentials of
physicians who are appointed to the staff or whose privileges are
up for renewal.2"7 The details of the procedures necessary for being appointed on staff are usually set forth in the hospital bylaws.2" 8 Within the hospital, there are at least two committees of
physicians which review the applicant physician's credentials prior
to initial appointment.2 "9 Prior to the renewal of medical staff privileges, more committees may be involved in the reappointment process because input on the physician's behavior can come from the
department chairman, the utilization review committee, or the sur207. See ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 200, at 235-38.
208. Extensive questions are asked in the application process regarding the physicians
complete chronology and medical training, his/her criminal and psychological record,
and proof of malpractice insurance coverage. The applicant usually has a personal interview with a member of the credentials committee and the application, with letters of
reference and verification of facts are reviewed by the credentials committee. The credentials committee issues a report, and the entire package of materials is reviewed by the
medical executive committee, which then makes a recommendation to the governing
board of the hospital. If the governing board is going to deny the application, it holds a
hearing with the physician prior to doing so. See generally Shields & Turk, Credentialing
and Utilization Review, in First Annual Health Care Law Conference presented by the
INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH LAW of Loyola University of Chicago School of Law and the
ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (1986).
For a credentialing decision, physicians are reviewed on such subjects as: blood use
review; medical records review; surgical case review; drug usage review; monitoring and
evaluation of emergency services; monitoring and evaluation of pathology and medical
laboratory services; and monitoring and evaluation of radiology services. See ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 200, at 235-38; see also Shields & Turk, supra.
209. The credentialing committee and the medical staff executive committee.
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gical review committee.21 °
The hospital administration has a strong interest in having the
physicians on staff performing their credentialing reviews conscientiously. One of the bases of expanding the liability of hospitals in
medical malpractice suits has been the theory of "negligent credentialing" - that through a thorough investigation of the physician's
background, the hospital knew or should have known that he was
likely to be a "negligent" doctor. The failure to identify an incompetent physician through the credentialing process, when information was available that might have demonstrated some index of
suspicion, and/or failure to act on that information by terminating,
disallowing, or abridging the doctor's staff privileges, could render
the hospital liable for any malpractice by that doctor.2 1
Trustees of hospitals may be found individually liable if the hospital is on notice of the doctor's negligent propensities and the hospital negligently renews his staff privileges.21 2 Therefore, hospitals
have encouraged more assiduous efforts by the credentialing committees (composed usually of physicians already on staff) in reviewing other physicians on staff and those applying for staff
membership.21 3
Between the AMA Masterfile 2t4 and the national data bank es210. See Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa.
1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 603 (3d Cir. 1988).
211. See Pickle v. Curns, 106 Ill. App. 3d 734, 435 N.E.2d 877 (2d Dist. 1982) (hospital can be liable for malpractice of physician if it knew or should have known that the
malpractice would take place); see also Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228566 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 19, 197.3), rev'd, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd, 20 Cal. 3d
500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978) (numerous prior malpractice cases put
hospital on notice of physician's propensity to commit malpractice); Ferguson v.
Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1976) (if a reasonable investigation of the
doctor's credentials would not have revealed any information on which a hospital might
deny staff privileges, there would not be hospital liability on this basis); Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 191 Neb. 224, 214 N.W.2d 490 (1974) (hospital not liable
because patient could not prove hospital had prior knowledge of incompetence).
212. See, e.g., Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534
(1975). Sometimes courts will refuse to impose the severe penalty of individual liability
on the members of the board or medical staff in the absence of any personal knowledge of
previous wrongdoing, or any fact which would have raised an index of suspicion about
the physician. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Hunt v. Rabon, 275
S.C. 475, 272 S.E.2d 643 (1980).
213. The lines of authority in the credentialing process can best be understood by
examining the relationships within the hospital. See The Report of the Joint Task Force
on Hospital-Medical Staff Relationships, AMA and AHA (Feb. 1985), for a complete
explanation of the different roles of the organized medical staff in the hospital and their
relationship to the hospital administration and the governing board of directors.
214. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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tablished by the passage of the HCQIA in 1986215 (but not yet operational), a credentials committee will have little excuse for not
knowing about a physician's prior PRO or Medicare sanctions, license or privilege suspensions or terminations, or state and hospital
disciplinary actions. Thus, all hospitals, HMOs, or private institutional health care providers which allow physicians on staff will be
on notice of all the information contained in those data banks. The
investigative, physician-monitoring responsibility of the credentials
committee, set out in the hospital by-laws which must comply with
the Joint Commission guidelines for credentials committees, has
long existed. These data banks will merely facilitate the work of
credentials committees, which will now be able to look in one place
for evidence of any kind of sanction or
judgment that has been
2 16
placed against a physician in any state.

In addition, this data bank probably will provide a prima facie
standard for hospital negligence in medical malpractice lawsuits.
If incriminating data were in the data bank and the credentialing
committee failed to discover it, a prima facie case for negligent
credentialing could be made out.217 Conversely, if nothing were in
the data bank, and the hospital had no other reason to be put on
notice of a physician's likelihood to perform below the reasonable
standard of care, then the hospital would have the defense that it
did not know nor have reason to know of the physician's likelihood
to commit malpractice. 1 8
By 1983, when the DRG and prospective payment system became the law, credential committees in hospitals throughout the
nation took on a peer review type function which was apart from
the original "risk management" function of the credentialing committee. Credential committees began to examine a doctor's credentials from a different point of view. The committees considered not
only the competency or qualifications of the doctor, but they began
to focus on how conservative the doctor's practice patterns are.
The committees now also must address such questions as: Does
215.

See supra note 138 and accompanying text.

216.

This is in addition to the AMA's "Masterfile."

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11137

(Supp. 1986); see infra note 190.
217. See Annotation, Hospital's Liability for Negligence in Selection or Appointment
of Staff Physician or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R.3D 981 (1973).

218.

See, e.g., Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital, 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301

N.W.2d 156 (1981)

for a discussion of the standard for holding a hospital liable to an

injured patient for the negligence of a doctor on the independent medical staff. In Johnson, the hospital failed to make reasonable efforts to investigate the doctor's qualifications
before appointing him to the staff, and was charged with having such knowledge as it
would have had if it had made such an investigation. Id. at 745, 301 N.W.2d at 175.
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the doctor tend to admit patients who are so sick they need to
overstay their DRGs? Has the doctor conformed to hospital policies that now reflect cost-containment priorities in medical practice? The physician reviewers on the credentialing committees
must now help the hospital further its cost-containment
mandate.21 9
220
The case of Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hospital
is an example of a doctor who did not do the "about face" in practice patterns, which prompted the credentials committee to deny
him renewal of staff privileges. 22' Dr. Friedman, a pulmonologist,

continued to do bronchoscopies for therapeutic as well as diagnostic purposes after the hospital policy had been changed to disallow
therapeutic bronchoscopies.222 Because of repeated violations of
hospital policy (i.e., repeated performances of therapeutic bronchoscopies), the credentialing committee refused to renew his staff
privileges.223

The express holding of the Friedman case was that the antitrust
laws could not protect the doctor from non-renewal. 224 But this

holding begs one very interesting issue in the case. When DRGs
no longer covered bronchoscopies for therapeutic purpose,225 the
appropriate policy committee had changed the hospital policies to
limit bronchoscopies to almost purely diagnostic purposes.226
When the pulmonologist continued to use bronchoscopies for therapeutic reasons, he lost money for the hospital. 22

His privileges

were revoked and numerous instances of disobeying hospital policy
were cited. 228 There was no suggestion that the doctor performed
219. Becker, The Physician;s Cost-Saving Role, in 86 BEST'S REV., LIFE-HEALTH
INS. ED. 62 (1986).
220. 672 F. Supp 171 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 603 (3d Cir. 1988).
221. Id. at 173.
222. Id. at 178.
223. Id. at 179.
224. The court refuted the argument that the hospital and the medical staff committee "conspired" to restrain trade. Id. at 193. The court found that the medical staff
committee was operating as an agent of the hospital, and that no conspiracy can exist
between principal and agent. Id. Also, there was no proven restraint of trade because the
defendant had not been precluded from access to the rest of the hospitals in the area, nor
was there any intent or effort on the part of the hospital to deny him such access. Id. at
188-90.
225. In fact, bronchoscopies had been singled out as being a procedure which was
overutilized, and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act targeted bronchoscopies,
among 11 other procedures, for special reductions in prevailing fees, citing them as particularly "overpriced."
226. Id. at 184.
227. Id. at 180.
228. Id.
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them in a negligent manner, only that he performed them too
liberally.229

It can be surmised that Dr. Friedman's liberal use of the procedure2 3° had been disliked but tolerated by the hospital for as long
as the hospital had been reimbursed on a "reasonable cost" basis.
This liberal practice pattern, however, was no longer compatible
with DRGs and the prospective reimbursement system. Those
same monitoring entities, which had previously tolerated Dr.
Friedman's history of uncalled for bronchoscopies, were prompted
2 3

to take action. 1
"Monitor mania" is reflected in the sheer number of monitoring
entities needed to revoke Dr. Friedman's privileges for use of bronchoscopies for therapeutic purposes. This case provides a good example of the myriad of entities which exist within the hospital
through which physicians and non-physicians monitor other physicians. At least twelve committees or entities in the hospital reviewed Dr. Friedman's practice patterns.2 32
Dr. Friedman may have been excessively zealous in the use of
bronchoscopies, but there still remain many instances where a
bronchoscopy legitimately may be the preferred mode of treat229. Id. at 189. The bronchoscopies were performed so liberally, in fact, that an inhouse and a outside blind audit of Dr. Friedman's files found that over one-half of his
bronchoscopies were not indicated and had insufficient lab test results to justify their

performance. Id. at 186.
230. At one point, Dr. Friedman apparently performed a therapeutic bronchoscopy
on a patient who had already died. Id. at 183. Furthermore, it appears from the record
that by all accounts, he overused the procedure and refused to justify his repeated violations of hospital policies regarding appropriate indications for the procedure. Id. at 18386.
231. Id. The hospital's long-standing difficulties with Dr. Friedman had never led to
suspension of privileges before. Id.
232. Id. at 177, 183-86. Those entities include:
1. The PROs which are mandated to examine over-utilization of bronchoscopies;
2. The medical staff committees involved in the review and monitoring of
Dr. Friedman's medical practices included the quality assurance committee,
charged with "reviewing the professional activities as they pertain to the quality
care of patients." Id. at 177. The quality assurance committee felt that the
violation of hospital policy against therapeutic bronchoscopies was not justified
on quality of care grounds;
3. The admissions and utilization review committee, which conducts studies
designed to evaluate "the appropriateness of admissions to the hospital, lengths
of stay, discharge practices, use of medical and hospital service and all related
factors which may contribute to the effective utilization of hospital and physician services." Id. at 178. It also analyzes how overutilization of hospital or
medical services affects the quality of patient care. They felt his overutilization
of bronchoscopies did not improve patient care and violated hospital policy;
4. The medical records committee, which makes recommendations regard-
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ment. Not permitting therapeutic use of bronchoscopies as a categorical policy would adversely affect quality of care in those cases
where therapeutic bronchoscopy is the treatment of choice.2 33 Any
doctor who knows about the Friedman case would certainly think
twice before he pressed for a therapeutic use of a bronchoscopy on
a patient.
The implications are clear: hospital policies are informing physicians of what procedures they may and may not perform and
under what circumstances. What happens to "independent medical judgment"? Although in Friedman the end result seems to
have been for the best (a physician who irresponsibly overused a
procedure was denied staff reappointment), the underlying principle involved could easily defeat the quality of care purposes of hospital policies. A holding such as Friedman can serve as a powerful
deterrent to doctors who might otherwise order tests or perform
procedures which are now allowed only under limited circumstances. The fear of "monitor mania" will have a chilling effect on
doctors who might object to hospital policies but who would not
want to risk jeopardizing their privilege status by making waves
with the hospital administration, including the physician particiing practices designed to improve the hospital's medical record-keeping function;
5. The operating room committee;
6. The grievance committee, which reported complaints to the endoscopy
committee;
7. The endoscopy committee - in this case, it was a joint committee of gastro-enterologists and pulmonary disease sections, which formulated guidelines
for the hospital policy committee;
8. The hospital policy committee, which incorporated into hospital policy
the acceptable circumstances for performing bronchoscopies and found those
policies to be repeatedly violated by Dr. Friedman;
9. The utilization review committee saw that he was violating the policy with
too much utilization. It made recommendations to the credentialing committee;
10. The credentialing committee, which recommended revoking his privileges, citing repeated examples of his violating hospital policy. The recommendations go to the board of directors;
11-12. The board of directors, who made the final decision to revoke his staff
privileges. The board of directors had two committees, the board executive
committee and the joint conference committee, which reviewed medical staff recommendations. The joint conference committee made decisions when the
board did not agree with the medical staff's recommendations.
233. For example, two recognized uses of therapeutic bronchoscopy are the removal
of an aspirated foreign body from the lungs of a patient (the alternative treatment would
be leaving the foreign body in the lung or doing open-chest surgery to remove it), and the
suctioning out of fluids and secretions retained in the airways (the alternative would be to
leave fluids accumulating in the lungs, thereby increasing intra-thoracic pressure and the
likelihood of infection).
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pants on the monitoring committees.234 On the other hand, if Dr.
Friedman was such a gross over-user of bronchoscopies, then the
prolonged and repetitive proceedings that had to be followed to
deny him privileges reveal that even when prompt action is warranted, the "monitor mania" systems impede it by the sheer
number of people and entities doing the monitoring and evaluating.
2.

Judicial Review of the Physician Reviewers

When physicians have received adverse reviews from other physicians who have examined their credentials and either denied
them appointment or reappointment to the medical staff, or suspended, curtailed, or terminated their staff privileges, the aggrieved
physicians have often sought review of those decisions in the
courts. The physician who has been victimized by "monitor
mania" seeks judicial review of the hospital committee's decision.
Generally, courts have exercised considerable restraint in their
willingness to overturn the decisions of private hospitals (via their
medical staff credentialing and other committees) to curtail or
deny staff privileges. 23 5 The policy of non-judicial review dovetails

234. See Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986), appeal
dismissed, 192 Cal. 3d 1638, 741 P.2d 613, 239 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1987).
235. The Patrick v. Burget case, discussed supra at notes 114-20 and accompanying
text, is a notable exception, and the apparent anti-competitive motive and consequences
of the denial of staff privileges led the court to override its usual policy of judicial restraint to find an antitrust violation, and grant treble damages.
The Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hospital case, discussed supra at notes
220-34 and accompanying text, did grant judicial review and examined the same evidence
that the hospital had examined, but ultimately refused to overturn the hospital's decision
on the grounds that the antitrust claims had not been proven. Other cases that reveal the
judiciary's extreme reluctance to second guess physicians on these kinds of decisions. See
Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (2d Dist.
1967). In Mauer, the court held that: "It is a well-settled rule that a private hospital has
the right to refuse to appoint a physician or surgeon to its medical staff, and this refusal is
not subject to judicial review; the decision of the hospital authorities in such matters is
final." Id. at 411, 232 N.E.2d at 778. In Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital,
123 11. 2d 49, 525 N.E.2d 50 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court followed the majority
rule, articulated in Mauer, of no judicial review of medical staff decisions to deny staff
privileges. Barrows did recognize an exception when privileges already granted are taken
away: courts then will examine the question as to whether the hospital's constitution and
by-laws, in permitting termination of staff privileges, are not "unreasonable, arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory." Id. at 50, 525 N.E.2d at 51. See also Claydon v. Sisters of
the Third Order of St. Francis, 180 Ill. App.3d 641, 536 N.E.2d 209 (4th Dist. 1989);
Gates v. Holy Cross Hosp., 175 Ill. App. 3d 439, 529 N.E.2d 1014 (1st Dist. 1988); Jain
v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 Il. App. 3d 420, 385 N.E.2d 108 (1st Dist. 1978).
See Note, Michigan Court Joins Majority in Denying JudicialReview of Staffing Decisions of Private Hospitals 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 339 (1982), for a summary of the
position of the majority of states on this issue.
For cases in the minority states which generally engage in judicial review of hospital
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with the public policy of encouraging peer review among physicians by granting immunities to physicians who participate in the
peer review function. The same sort of immunities granted in the
HCQIA 2 36 are contained in many state hospital licensing laws as
well.23 7
B.

Utilization Review. Non-PhysiciansReviewing
Medical Decisions

As a prerequisite to obtaining medicare reimbursement for any
of its patients, hospitals are required by the Medicare Act 238 to
maintain "utilization review committees" ("URCs") in order to assure that patients will receive neither a greater nor a lesser level of
care than they need. 239 The URC must include at least two physicians and may also include other professional personnel, such as
registered nurses and social workers. 2 ° An attending physician
may not be a member of a URC that is conducting a review of that
peer review decisions, see Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 1 I N.H. 276, 281
A.2d 589, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 5 (1971); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192
A.2d 817 (1963); Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n., 92 N.J. Super. 163, 222 A.2d 530
(Ch. Div.), aff'd, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (App. Div. 1967); Kelly v. St. Vincent
Hosp., 102 N.M. 201, 692 P.2d 1350 (1984). Sussman also held that a physician was not
entitled to counsel at hearing. This aspect was overruled by Garrow v. Elizabeth General
Hospital and Dispensary, 155 N.J. Super. 78, 382 A.2d 78 (1977), modified, 79 N.J. 549,
401 A.2d 533 (1979); cf. Szczerbaniuk v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 180 Ill.
App. 3d 706, 536 N.E.2d 138 (2d Dist. 1989). In Szczerbaniuk, the court refused to
apply the immunities from the Illinois Hospital Licensing Act to the hospital's CEO, who
terminated privileges of a physician accused of sexual harassment. Id. at 711, 536 N.E.2d
at 141. In order for those immunities to apply, the statute required a showing that the
hospital administrator's decision was "a result of the acts, omissions, decisions, or any
other conduct of a medical utilization committee, medical review committee, patient care
audit committee, medical care evaluation committee, quality review committee, credential committee, peer review committee, or any other committee whose purpose . . . is
internal quality control." Id. at 710, 536 N.E.2d at 140. The court agreed with the
plaintiff that the termination of his privileges was not the result of an immunized committee decision, but rather of one man's unilateral decision. Id. at 711, 536 N.E.2d at 141.
The appellate court did not feel that the policy of the Licensing Act, i.e., "to foster effective self-policing by members of the medical profession in matters unique to that profession and to thereby promote the legitimate State interest in improving the quality of
health care in Illinois," was furthered by the CEO's unilateral decision. Id. at 712, 536
N.E.2d at 142 (citing Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 176 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1024,
531 N.E.2d 989, 997 (1st Dist. 1988)). Thus, his act of terminating the plaintiff's privileges was not immune from civil liability. Id.
236. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the HCQIA.
237. See Illinois Hospital Licensing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 151.2
(1989).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1137 (1987).
239. See Kuebler v. Secretary of the U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 579 F.
Supp. 1436, 1440 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1982).
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" ' The Joint Commission also requires
physician's patient's care.24
hospitals and health care providers to maintain an effective utiliza242
tion review program as a prerequisite to receiving accreditation.
The URC directly monitors and questions doctors' medical decisions. It is the utilization reviewer who asks whether a medical
decision is medically necessary.243 Charged with the responsibility
of keeping treatments to a minimum so as to enable the hospital to
comply with DRGs (and to make a profit from them), the utilization reviewer is asking the same kinds of questions in the hospital
that a PRO reviewer asks in its external review. 24
In both the in-hospital URC and the outside PRO, nurses and
other non-physicians frequently initiate the questioning of the
medical decisions. 245 Before a URC can find that certain medical
services were not necessary, it must give the patient's physician an
opportunity to consult with the committee and to give his side of
the story. 246 According to the criteria set forth in the Joint Commission's manual: "Nonphysician health care professionals may
participate in the development of review criteria. "247 Utilization
review programs allow non-professionals to question professional
judgment, and require those professionals to defend and justify
their medical decisions to these non-professionals.
This situation is inherently volatile because physicians cannot be
expected to appreciate having nurses and other non-physicians
stand in judgment and question their medical decisions. Outrage is
241.

42 C.F.R. § 405.1137(b)(3) (1987); see Kraemer v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 214, 216

(2d Cir. 1984).
242. See ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 200, at 300. The utilization review
program must "assure appropriate allocation of the hospital's resources by striving to
provide quality patient care in the most cost-effective manner." Id. Its concerns are
"overutilization, underutilization, and inefficient scheduling of resources." Id. Utilization review includes "concurrent review" of patient charts focusing on "diagnoses,
problems, procedures and/or practitioners with identified or suspected utilization-related
problems." Id. at 299-300.
243. The Senate Report on the Medicare statute states that:
[H]ospitals and extended care facilities participating in the program would be
required to have in effect a utilization review plan providing for a review of
admissions to the institution, lengths of stays, and the medical necessity for
services provided with the objective of promoting the efficient use of services
and facilities.
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st. Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1943.

244.

42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1137 (1987).

245.

See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of "medically

necessary."
246.

42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k)(4) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1137 (1987). See Hultzman v.

Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1974).
247. See ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 200, at § 1.5.2.2.
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the likely response of the physician, for medical decisions should
be, by their very nature, precisely the sort of decisions which physicians make. If they are to be questioned', it ought only be by other
physicians of comparable training.248 It is toward that end that the
AMA has embarked on its exhaustive quality assurance program,
defining what specific treatment steps are necessary in specific
medical situations.
C. JudicialReview of Utilization Reviewers
In 1986, a California appellate court addressed the inevitable
conflict between the doctor who wants to do more for the patient,
and keep the patient in the hospital longer, and the utilization reviewer, who wants to adhere to DRGs, and discharge the patient at
the time prescribed by the reimburser. The court in Wickline v.
State 249 was the first to acknowledge that the utilization reviewer
influences treatment decisions, and should therefore share some of
the liability when those decisions are held to be negligent.25 °
In Wickline, a utilization reviewer influenced a rigid application
of a DRG, which caused a patient to be discharged before the patient was truly medically ready for discharge. 25' Foreseeable postoperative complications occurred, and it was found that they could
have been either averted or, at least, minimized, had the patient
stayed in the hospital longer, as the treating physician had suggested.252 The physician was found liable for the negligently premature discharge. 253 His defense that the utilization review
committee had refused coverage past a certain fixed time period
was not valid against a negligence charge.254
Wickline also illustrates the dilemma of doctors who do not wish
to antagonize the hospital or its utilization review committees, and
yet must act in accordance with the best interests of their patients.
To what lengths should a doctor "go to bat" for additional services
for his patient? It is not always clear - except in retrospect 248. The AMA feels that what is medically necessary should be a question asked and
answered by physicians.
249.

183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986), appeal dismissed, 192 Cal. 3d

1638, 741 P.2d 613, 239 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1987).
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at -, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
Id. at -, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
Id. at -, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
Id. at -, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
Id. See also Furrow, Medical Malpracticeand Cost Containment; Tightening the

Screws, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 985 (1986); Morreim, Cost Constraintsas a Malpractice
Defense, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (Feb./Mar. 1988).
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what interests of the patient can be compromised without undue
risk.
When the physician is certain that the decision of the utilization
reviewers is wrong, and feels that medical necessity does exist and
reimbursement should be allowed, the law will generally support
his efforts in favor of the patient.255 Nevertheless, the acrimony
and expense of the confrontation, as well as the
sheer resentment of
2 56
it, takes its toll on the defending physician.
VII.

MONITORING OF MEDICAL DECISIONS
BY THIRD-PARTY PAYORS

As the previously discussed entities force physicians to justify
their treatment plans to non-physicians and colleagues alike, another interest group has recently become more involved in questioning and monitoring medical decisions: the third-party payors.
The government is retrenching on payments, particularly with
DRGs, and thus third-party payors are being looked to with
greater frequency for coverage of medical expenses. After years of
deferring to the judgment of physicians, insurance companies are
instituting their own systems of monitoring physician treatment
decisions. 257 The days when insurance companies unquestioningly
paid out on medical claims are gone.
The insurance companies, like hospitals and the government,
have jumped onto the physician-monitoring "bandwagon." The
insurance companies perform their own independent inquiry by
asking: "Is this medically necessary?" and "What is the appropriate length of stay?

2

58

255. The question boils down to one of Medicare coverage. In assessing the patient's
condition for the purpose of judicial review of final determinations of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services regarding entitlement to Medicare benefits, the court is required to use a common sense, non-technical approach. In determining the medial necessity for a specific service, the "proper legal standard ... involves consideration of the
patient's condition as a whole, rather than an analysis of the specific services provided."
Gartmann v. Secretary of U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 633 F. Supp. 671, 679
(E.D.N.Y. 1986).
256. For a thorough discussion of utilization review programs and the liabilities that
arise from them, see Jespersen & Kendall, Utilization Review Programs:Avoiding Liability
While Controlling Costs, NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS Ass'N, 1988 HEALTH LAW UPDATE PART V. See also Gosfield, supra note 112.
257. In April 1987, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the nation's largest private health insurer, issued the first guidelines aimed at getting doctors to eliminate unnecessary testing.
See Findlay, Are We Hooked on Tests?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 23, 1987.
258. Many insurance companies have hired private "medical review companies,"
which have sprung up for the express purpose of monitoring medical necessity and length
of stay questions for insurance companies. An example is Private Health Care Systems,
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Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the largest of the private third-party
payors, has established two in-house programs which monitor and
evaluate various medical technologies, towards the end of giving
coverage guidelines to their member plans. 259 The first, the "Technology Evaluation and Coverage Program," is an in-house program which monitors and evaluates "technologies," which are
defined as "any drug, device or procedure. ' 260 Employed doctors,
medical researchers, and other medical personnel thoroughly review the peer-reviewed medical literature to see how the scientific
and medical communities have evaluated the particular procedure.2 6 1 The reviewers address questions such as: Is this procedure widely accepted by the medical community? Has the medical
literature, that is, peer-reviewed medical journals and articles,
demonstrated with consistency that the procedure or technology is
tried and proven? 262 If so, then the program establishes an explicit
set of criteria for circumstances under which the examined technology should be used 263 and, presumably, coverage permitted.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield also has instituted a "Medical Necessity
Program," which publishes "Medical Necessity Guidelines" for
distribution to health care providers it insures. 26 These guidelines
establish the appropriate indications for such common diagnostic
tests as chest X-rays and ECGs. The Medical Necessity Program
evaluates technologies and procedures that are not particularly
Ltd. Hired by insurance companies, this review company employs nurses who decide
whether, and to what extent, the insurance company will cover an anticipated medical
hospitalization. Patients covered by insurance companies that contract with Private
Health Care Systems must have their doctor call the company prior to performing surgery or other procedures, in order to get approval for coverage of the procedure or surgery. This pre-certification review is based on criteria established by OPTIMED, a
private group of medical practitioners who established their own guidelines for medical
necessity and length of stay. While those guidelines are often similar to those of the
government, they are not the same. Telephone interview with Linda Parsons, nurse reviewer at Private Healthcare Systems, Ltd. (May 31, 1989).
259. There are 76 insurance programs across the country which are part of Blue
Cross/Blue Shield.
260. Telephone interview with David Tannenbaum, head of the Technology Evaluation and Medical Necessity Programs, Blue Cross/Blue Shield (June 6, 1989).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. The program evaluates 30 technologies per year, focusing on those which are
likely to have a wide application, such as lithotripsy, magnetic resonance imaging
("MRI"), and angioplasty.
The medical literature review also looks carefully at the "health outcome" of the technology. On balance, does it really have a positive effect? The literature analysis evaluates
the experience of the overall medical community with regard to the efficacy of the technology. Id.
264. Id.
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new, but which may have been overused or inappropriately used in
the past.265 These insurance company reviewers, working with the
American College of Physicians (Internists) and other medical specialty societies, look at routine clinical care to evaluate what is
medically necessary.266
Blue Cross/Blue Shield also has put together its own data bank,
including information regarding nationwide claims experience, so
as to be able to show employers how their claims experiences compare with those of other employers in other regions.2 6 7 These data
banks enable them to formulate their own rates of reimbursement.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield is at the vanguard of private insurers.
Its efforts to establish its own reimbursement criteria by deciding
what is appropriate and necessary medical care reflect an industrywide trend. Whether the criteria are set up in-house, as at Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, or whether the insurance company contracts to
have an outside service review medical necessity, the end result is
the same: non-physicians are establishing medical guidelines and
making decisions which have a powerful impact on medical decisions and judgment. Yet another bureaucracy, apart from and different than the government and the hospital, is telling physicians
which medical procedures are necessary and which are not.268
VIII.

PHYSICIANS MONITORED BY THE LAY PUBLIC:
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

While not constituting a monitoring entity per se, the physician's
patients and the patient's lawyers pose a constant threat of painful
scrutiny of the physician's medical decisions. When every patient
is a potential adversary in court, the traditional intimacy of the
doctor-patient relationship is corroded. The threat of a medical
malpractice suit has shaken the foundations of the traditional doctor-patient relationship based on mutual trust and honesty.2 69
The medical malpractice trial presents the most stark example of
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Gallivan, Blues' Data Bank. More Clout, Closer Ties? HOSPITALS, May 20,
1986, at 26.
268. Previously a policy which covered surgery required only that the patient's physician state that the surgery was necessary. Some policies required a second opinion regarding the necessity of the surgery. But this new insurance company trend of pegging
insurance coverage to an in-house definition of which procedures are necessary, effective,
and have positive outcomes, constitutes an even greater intrusion on the independent
judgment of the physician.
269. R. FISH, M. EHRHARDT & B. FISH, MALPRACTICE: MANAGING YOUR DEFENSE 3 (1985).
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untrained, non-professionals monitoring medical decisions. Lay
jurors, with no medical training whatsoever, retrospectively pass
judgment on medical decisions which were made years before. The
medical training the juror gets prior to passing judgment on a physician's medical decisions is limited to that to which the juror is
exposed in the courtroom. 270 The lay juror only has the guidance
of expert witnesses, who have the benefit of hindsight, and a leisurely perusal of the medical records and medical literature on the
subject. Those witnesses can be misleading due to the way their
testimony is elicited or cross-examined by attorneys.2 71
It is not that medical malpractice does not occur, nor that physicians should not have to be accountable to patients who have been
negligently treated, but to rest the ultimate decision of what medical judgments were negligent or in the realm of "reasonable care"
in the hands of lay jurors who merely have a number of weeks of
courtroom medical training, strikes physicians as being grossly unfair and inappropriate. In the long run, the spector of the patient
as potential adversary in a jury trial may do more to erode the
doctor-patient relationship, and ultimately the quality of care, than
anything else discussed in this Article.2 72
Much effort and publicity has been given to the efforts of various
states to reform the tort system. 273 Reforms most urgently sought
have included:
that can be recovered as
1.) limitations on the amount of money
274
damages in medical malpractice cases;275
2.) limiting non-economic damages;
3.) limiting punitive damages,27 6 or only allowing a judge, in270. M. BELLI, BELLI FOR YOUR MALPRACTICE DEFENSE 195 (1989).
271. R. FISH, M. EHRHARDT & B. FISH, supra note 269, at 63.
272. Legislative efforts at tort reform have done little to stem the ever-rising costs of
medical malpractice litigation. If a few fewer frivolous suits are brought as a result of tort
reform measures, the cost savings are exceeded by higher and higher jury verdicts on
cases which get tried. See Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: ConstitutionalAttacks on Medical MalpracticeLaws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195, 196 n.2 (1985).
273. For a summary of the report from the director of the American Tort Reform
Association on tort reform activities in state legislatures across the United States, see
Shalowitz, Tort Reform; Outlook "Encouraging"in 8 States: A TRA, CRAIN COMMUNICATION, INC.; Bus. INS., Feb. 6, 1989, at 3.
274. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-2-2, 16-9.5-4-1 to 4-3 (West 1986); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15
(1984).
275. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(b) (1986); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.80 (West 1987).
276. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1115 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507:16 (1986).
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stead of a jury, to award punitive damages in a separate trial after
the defendant is found liable for actual damages;
4.)

limiting attorney's fees;277

5.)

278
amending or abolishing joint and several liabilty rules;

6.)

abolishing the "collateral source rule '

27 9

under which a jury

is not informed about the other sources of compensation - such
as insurance or workers' compensation - to which a plaintiff is
entitled; and
a plaintiff over a set
7.) allowing damage awards to be paid to
28 °
period of time, instead of in a lump sum.

State legislatures have addressed different aspects of tort reform,
with varying provisions being adopted. Nonetheless, almost as
soon as tort reform legislation is passed, it is countered with legislative and legal challenges, mostly from trial lawyers, which put
the long-term outcome of the reform legislation in doubt.2 8'
The consensus of the studies by those involved in tort reform
seems to be that tort reform legislation has not resulted either in a
lowering of medical malpractice insurance premiums or in a diminution in the size of damage awards.282 Rather, costs are still rising. Putting it mildly, James Todd, M.D., a senior deputy
executive vice-president of the American Medical Association,
stated: "Tort reform has not been, in actuality, as successful as we
would have liked to have seen it." "It's been gutted by constitu277. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1114(d) (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14 7.5 (Supp. 1985).
278. Under this doctrine, any one of several defendants may be required to pay as
much as 100% of an award to a claimant, regardless of its degree of fault, if the other
defendants are unable to contribute to the award. See generally Note, Tort Equitable
Indemnity Under Comparative Negligence. Anomaly or Necessity?, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1057,
1076 (1986).
279. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6862 (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (1980).
280. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.78 (West 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1705 (1989).
281. See, e.g., Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 497 N.E.2d 763 (1986) (Illinois
Supreme Court declared review panel unconstitutional); Note, Bernier v. Burris: The

Constitutional Implications of Abolishing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1285 (1985)); see also Lopez v. Finnegan, No. CV-87-00232
(N.M. Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 1989) (trial court declared the New Mexico Medical Malprac-

tice Act's damage cap of $500,000 unconstitutional); Condemarin v. University Hosp.,
No. 20602 (Utah May 1, 1989) (striking down $100,000 damage cap in suits against
government health facilities as violative of the equal protection clause).
282. See Holthus, After Tort Reform: What's Next?. HoSPITALS, Sept. 20, 1988, at
48. In referring to a study completed, Holthus stated: "Patricia Danzon, a professor at
the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, often considered the leading researcher on
tort reform, has found ... that the number and size of claims against physicians continued to increase steadily, but not as fast as they would have increased without tort reforms." Id.
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tional challenges
and the further expansion of liability by the
28 3

courts.

IX.

CONCLUSION

The Bad News
There is no professional in the world whose decisions are more
reviewed, monitored, and critiqued, both by peers and by lesser
educated para-professionals and non-professionals, than the physician practicing in the United States. From the physician's point of
view, this "monitor mania" poses a tremendous distraction from
practicing medicine, which is, after all, what a physician is best
trained to do. The additional time, paperwork, meetings, hearings,
and psychic and emotional energy required of physicians to participate and comply with the various monitoring entities which impinge on the practice of medicine impose an enormous burden on
the physician.
Physician's fees, which rose sharply to cover steep rises in malpractice insurance, will continue to go up to cover the additional
expenses of hiring office personnel to handle the deluge of
paperwork from the third-party and Medicare/Medicaid reimbursers. Physicians have had to pay out large sums for accountants,
lawyers, practice management consultants, and a host of other
business-type consultants who are needed to help the physician
cope with the maze of laws, rules, and regulations to which his
practice has become subject. The hospital committee work is nondelegable and non-billable, but its demands on a physician's time
are great and constant.
Perhaps most galling to physicians is the indignity of having to
explain and justify his/her medical decisions to non-professionals,
or to physicians who are less trained, less experienced, and less
involved in actual patient care. Ultimately, "monitor mania" compels the expenditure of time away from patients, from practicing
medicine, from doing medical research, or from performing the
professional tasks for which a physician is trained.
The Good News
Although the medical profession in America today is beleaguered, there are positive aspects of "monitor mania." Physicians
do have to face the reality that theirs is not a profession as generously subsidized by the government as it has been. The reality of
283.

Id.
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huge population increases of public aid patients - be they Medicaid, Medicare, or totally uninsured - means that cost-consciousness in the practice of medicine is an essential consideration to
factor into medical decision-making. The carte blanche in medical
treatment afforded by "reasonable cost" reimbusement under
Medicare gave an unrealistic wealth to physicians and fostered excessive charges and rampant abuses. The government must get
control of its expenditures, and the idea of monitoring fees, medical necessity, and fraud and abuse of the system is critical.
The problem, as this Article has hopefully revealed, is that the
lack of coordination, the duplication and cross-purposes at which
the myriad of monitoring entities exist generate more expenditures
in bureaucratic waste - just when those dollars are tight and the
need for them infinite - than they may save. Untold thousands are
being spent in the formulating of medical practice guidelines and
procedures by governmental entities, the AMA, insurance companies, and health care providers. Efforts are being duplicated and
triplicated toward the end of ushering out independent medical
judgment and imposing uniformity and standardization of medical
treatment. "Cook-book medicine" appears to be the wave of the
future - but too many cooks are writing the recipes.
In trying to enumerate the major medical monitoring entities,
this Article has, per force, fallen short of enumerating them all.
Nor has the author attempted to discuss any one of the reviewing
entities or prodedures from a detailed, pratitioner's point of view.
Hopefully, the discussions in this Article have demonstrated that if
quality health care is to survive, we must not drive away the intellectual cream of our univerisities from studying medicine by placing the profession under siege.
Unfortunately, it appears that the dual goals of cost-containment
and quality care are both suffering from our current piecemeal,
quagmire of "monitor-maniacal" regulation.

